From 26b59a90d22c34257a9a9921554bcc1e2e8ed83d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Bernie Hoeneisen Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 22:52:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] added references --- .../draft-symeonidis-medup-requirements.mkd | 31 +++++++++---------- .../references/diaz-measuring-anonymity.mkd | 19 ++++++++++++ .../pfitzmann-terminology-privacy.mkd | 13 ++++++++ shared/references/tor-timing-attacks.mkd | 8 +++++ shared/references/unger-sok.mkd | 2 +- 5 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 shared/references/diaz-measuring-anonymity.mkd create mode 100644 shared/references/pfitzmann-terminology-privacy.mkd create mode 100644 shared/references/tor-timing-attacks.mkd diff --git a/medup-requirements/draft-symeonidis-medup-requirements.mkd b/medup-requirements/draft-symeonidis-medup-requirements.mkd index 4036b7b2..e71ff1f3 100644 --- a/medup-requirements/draft-symeonidis-medup-requirements.mkd +++ b/medup-requirements/draft-symeonidis-medup-requirements.mkd @@ -155,7 +155,9 @@ https://autocrypt.org/background.html # Basic Functional Requirements -This section outlines the functional requirements. We follow the requirements extracted from the literature on private emails and instant messaging~\cite{Unger,Ermoshina,Clark} +This section outlines the functional requirements. We follow the +requirements extracted from the literature on private emails and +instant messaging {{Unger}}. * Message: send and receive message(s) * Multi-device support: synchronisation across multiple devices @@ -241,11 +243,10 @@ can be from local controlling one point of the communication channel such as an entity or a communication link of the network. It can also be a global adversary controlling several entities and communication links of the channel, gaining the capability of correlating traffic -such as in timing attacks even for end-to-end communication -systems. Therefore, -confidentiality of messages exchanged in the system should be -guaranteed with the use of encryption schemes such as symmetric, -asymmetric, or homomorphic encryption. +such as in timing attacks even for end-to-end communication systems +{{Tor}}. Therefore, confidentiality of messages exchanged in the +system should be guaranteed with the use of encryption schemes such as +symmetric, asymmetric, or homomorphic encryption. ### Tampering With Data and Data Authentication @@ -294,12 +295,11 @@ such as the message operators, the network node or third parties. To mitigate identifiability threats, the anonymity of users must be guaranteed. It is defined as the "Anonymity of a subject from an attacker’s perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently -identify the subject within a set of subjects, the anonymity set". Essentially, to enable -anonymity, there is always need to be a set of possible subjects such -that for an adversary the communicating user can be equally likely of -any other user in the set. Thus, an adversary cannot deduce who is the originator of a +identify the subject within a set of subjects, the anonymity set" +{{Pfitzmann}}. Essentially, to enable anonymity, there is always need +to be a set of possible subjects such that for an adversary the +communicating user can be equally likely of any other user in the set +{{Diaz}}. Thus, an adversary cannot deduce who is the originator of a message. Anonymity can be achieved with the use of pseudonyms and cryptographic schemes such as anonymous remailers (i.e., mixnets), anonymous communications channels (e.g., Tor), and secret sharing. @@ -328,10 +328,9 @@ parties. In contrast to anonymity and unlinkability, where the relationship from an IOI to a user is preserved, undetectability is defined as "Undetectability of an item of interest (IOI) from an attacker’s perspective means that the attacker cannot sufficiently -distinguish whether it exists or not.". Undetectability of IOIs can be -guaranteed with the use of cryptographic schemes such as Mix-nets and -obfuscation mechanisms such as dummy traffic. +distinguish whether it exists or not." {{Pfitzmann}}. Undetectability +of IOIs can be guaranteed with the use of cryptographic schemes such +as Mix-nets and obfuscation mechanisms such as dummy traffic. ## Information disclosure -- confidentiality diff --git a/shared/references/diaz-measuring-anonymity.mkd b/shared/references/diaz-measuring-anonymity.mkd new file mode 100644 index 00000000..bc079239 --- /dev/null +++ b/shared/references/diaz-measuring-anonymity.mkd @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ + Diaz: +# target: + title: Towards Measuring Anonymity + author: + - + name: Claudia Diaz + ins: C. Diaz + - + name: Stefaan Seys + ins: St. Seys + - + name: Joris Claessens + ins: J. Claessens + - + name: Bart Preneel + ins: B. Preneel + date: 2002 + seriesinfo: + PET: Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Second International Workshop, San Francisco, CA, USA, April 14-15, 2002, Revised Papers, pp. 54-68 \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/shared/references/pfitzmann-terminology-privacy.mkd b/shared/references/pfitzmann-terminology-privacy.mkd new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f4e48aef --- /dev/null +++ b/shared/references/pfitzmann-terminology-privacy.mkd @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + Pfitzmann: + target: https://nyuscholars.nyu.edu/en/publications/sok-secure-messaging + title: "A terminology for talking about privacy by data minimization: Anonymity, unlinkability, undetectability, unobservability, pseudonymity, and identity management" + author: + - + name: Andreas Pfitzmann + ins: A. Pfitzmann + - + name: Marit Hansen + ins: M. Hansen + date: 2010 + # seriesinfo: + diff --git a/shared/references/tor-timing-attacks.mkd b/shared/references/tor-timing-attacks.mkd new file mode 100644 index 00000000..255e81dc --- /dev/null +++ b/shared/references/tor-timing-attacks.mkd @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + Tor: + target: https://blog.torproject.org/one-cell-enough-break-tors-anonymity/ + title: "One cell is enough to break Tor's anonymity" + author: + name: Tor Project +# ins: + date: Accessed 2019-06 + # seriesinfo: diff --git a/shared/references/unger-sok.mkd b/shared/references/unger-sok.mkd index 3ebed394..a55a9fb3 100644 --- a/shared/references/unger-sok.mkd +++ b/shared/references/unger-sok.mkd @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - Unger.SoK: + Unger: target: https://nyuscholars.nyu.edu/en/publications/sok-secure-messaging title: "SoK: Secure Messaging" author: