diff --git a/pep-rating/Makefile b/pep-rating/Makefile index 84b7307c..602dcec6 100644 --- a/pep-rating/Makefile +++ b/pep-rating/Makefile @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ #!/usr/bin/make -f NAME := draft-marques-pep-rating -REV := 02 +REV := 03 DRAFT := $(NAME)-$(REV) OUTPUTS = $(DRAFT).xml $(DRAFT).txt $(DRAFT).html diff --git a/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.html b/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.html new file mode 100644 index 00000000..97170ec4 --- /dev/null +++ b/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.html @@ -0,0 +1,986 @@ + + + + + + + pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Network Working GroupH. Marques
Internet-DraftpEp Foundation
Intended status: InformationalB. Hoeneisen
Expires: January 8, 2020Ucom.ch
July 07, 2019
+ +

pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating
+ draft-marques-pep-rating-02

+ +

Abstract

+

In many Opportunistic Security scenarios end-to-end encryption is automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often required to provide the users with easy means to carry out authentication.

+

Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different peers may have a different Privacy Status, e.g., unencrypted, encrypted and encrypted as well as authenticated. Even each message from/to a single peer may have a different Privacy Status.

+

To display the actual Privacy Status to the user, this document defines a Privacy Rating scheme and its mapping to a traffic-light semantics. A Privacy Status is defined on a per-message basis as well as on a per-identity basis. The traffic-light semantics (as color rating) allows for a clear and easily understandable presentation to the user in order to optimize the User Experience (UX).

+

This rating system is most beneficial to Opportunistic Security scenarios and is already implemented in several applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp).

+

Status of This Memo

+

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

+

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

+

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

+

This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2020.

+

Copyright Notice

+

Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

+

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

+ + +
+

Table of Contents

+ + +

+1. Introduction +

+

In many Opportunistic Security [RFC7435] scenarios end-to-end encryption is automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often required to provide the users with easy means to carry out authentication.

+

Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different identities may have a different Privacy Status, e.g.

+

+ + +

Even each message from or to a single peer may have a different Privacy Status.

+

To display the actual Privacy Status to the user, this document defines a Privacy Rating scheme and its mapping to a traffic-light semantics, i.e., a mapping to different color codes as used in a traffic-light:

+

+ + +

Note: While “yellow” color is used in the context of traffic-lights (e.g., in North America), in other parts of the world (e.g., the UK) this is generally referred to as “orange” or “amber” lights. For the scope of this document, “yellow”, “amber”, and “orange” refer to the same semantics.

+

A Privacy Status is defined on a per-message basis as well as on a per-identity basis. The traffic-light semantics (as color rating) allows for a clear and easily understandable presentation to the user in order to optimize the User Experience (UX). To serve also (color-)blind Internet users or those using monochrome displays, the traffic light color semantics may also be presented by simple texts and symbols for signaling the corresponding Privacy Status.

+

The proposed definitions are already implemented and used in applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp) [I-D.birk-pep]. This document is targeted to applications based on the pEp framework and Opportunistic Security [RFC7435]. However, it may be also used in other applications as suitable.

+

Note: The pEp [I-D.birk-pep] framework proposes to automatize the use of end-to-end encryption for Internet users of email and other messaging applications and introduces methods to easily allow authentication.

+

+1.1. Requirements Language +

+

The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, “SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

+

+1.2. Terms +

+

The following terms are defined for the scope of this document:

+

+ + +

+ + +

+ + +

+2. Per-Message Privacy Rating +

+

+2.1. Rating Codes +

+

To rate messages (cf. also Appendix A.1), the following 13 Rating codes are defined as scalar values (decimal):

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Rating codeRating label
-3under attack
-2broken
-1mistrust
0undefined
1cannot decrypt
2have no key
3unencrypted
4unencrypted for some
5unreliable
6reliable
7trusted
8trusted and anonymized
9fully anonymous
+

+2.2. Color Codes +

+

For an Internet user to understand what the available Privacy Status is, the following colors (traffic-light semantics) are defined:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Color codeColor label
-1red
0no color
1yellow
2green
+

+2.3. Surjective Mapping of Rating Codes into Color Codes +

+

Corresponding User Experience (UX) implementations use a surjective mapping of the Rating Codes into the Color Codes (in traffic light semantics) as follows:

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
Rating codesColor codeColor label
-3 to -1-1red
0 to 50no color
61yellow
7 to 92green
+

This mapping is used in current pEp implementations to signal the Privacy Status (cf. Section 7.2).

+

+2.4. Semantics of Color and Rating Codes +

+

+2.4.1. Red +

+

The red color MUST only be used in three cases:

+

+ + +

+2.4.2. No Color +

+

No specific (or a gray color) MUST be shown in the following cases:

+

+ + +

+2.4.3. Yellow +

+

+ + +

+2.4.4. Green +

+

+ + +

By consequence that means, that the pEp propositions don’t strictly follow the TOFU (cf. [RFC7435]) approach, in order to avoid signaling trust without peers verifying their channel first.

+

In current pEp implementations (cf. Section 7) only rating code 7 is achieved.

+

The rating codes 8 and 9 are reserved for future use in pEp implementations which also secure meta-data (rating code 8), by using a peer-to-peer framework like GNUnet [GNUnet], and/or allow for fully anonymous communications (rating code 9), where sender and receiver don’t know each other, but trust between the endpoints could be established nevertheless.

+

+3. Per-Identity Privacy Rating +

+

The same Color Codes (red, no color, yellow and green) as for messages (cf. Section 2.2) MUST be applied for identities (peers), so that a user can easily understand, which identities private communication is possible with.

+

The green color code MUST be applied to an identity whom the pEp handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] was successfully carried out with.

+

The yellow color code MUST be set whenever a public key could be obtained to securely encrypt messages to an identity, although a MITM attack cannot be excluded.

+

The no color code MUST be used for the case that no public key is available to engage in private communications with an identity.

+

The red color code MUST only be used when an identity is marked as mistrusted.

+

[[ It’s not yet clear if there are proper cases where it makes sense to set an identity automatically to the red color code, as it appears to be difficult to detect attacks (e.g., secret key leakage) at the other endpoint with certainty. ]]

+

+4. Security Considerations +

+

[[ TODO ]]

+

+5. Privacy Considerations +

+

[[ TODO ]]

+

+6. IANA Considerations +

+

This document has no actions for IANA.

+

+7. Implementation Status +

+

+7.1. Introduction +

+

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

+

According to [RFC7942], “[…] this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit.”

+

+7.2. Current software implementing pEp +

+

The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying degrees) already exists:

+

+ + +

pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the pEp Foundation.

+

All software is available as Free Software and published also in source form.

+

+8. Acknowledgements +

+

The authors would like to thank the following people who have provided feedback or significant contributions to the development of this document: Leon Schumacher and Volker Birk

+

This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed and extended with funding by the Internet Society’s Beyond the Net Programme on standardizing pEp. [ISOC.bnet]

+

+9. References

+

+9.1. Normative References

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
[I-D.birk-pep] +Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Privacy by Default", Internet-Draft draft-birk-pep-03, March 2019.
[RFC2119] +Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997.
[RFC4949] +Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007.
[RFC7435] +Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, December 2014.
+

+9.2. Informative References

+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
[GNUnet] +Grothoff, C., "The GNUnet System", October 2017.
[I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] +Birk, V., Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA Considerations", Internet-Draft draft-birk-pep-trustwords-03, March 2019.
[I-D.marques-pep-handshake] +Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake", Internet-Draft draft-marques-pep-handshake-02, March 2019.
[ISOC.bnet] +Simao, I., "Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy’s protocols", June 2017.
[RFC7942] +Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016.
[SRC.enigmailpep]"Source code for Enigmail/pEp", July 2019.
[SRC.pepforandroid]"Source code for pEp for Android", July 2019.
[SRC.pepforios]"Source code for pEp for iOS", July 2019.
[SRC.pepforoutlook]"Source code for pEp for Outlook", July 2019.
+

+Appendix A. Excerpts from the pEp Reference Implementation +

+

This section provides excerpts of the running code from the pEp reference implementation pEp engine (C99 programming language).

+

+A.1. pEp rating +

+

From the reference implementation by the pEp foundation, src/message_api.h:

+
+      typedef enum _PEP_rating {
+          PEP_rating_undefined = 0,
+          PEP_rating_cannot_decrypt,
+          PEP_rating_have_no_key,
+          PEP_rating_unencrypted,
+          PEP_rating_unencrypted_for_some,
+          PEP_rating_unreliable,
+          PEP_rating_reliable,
+          PEP_rating_trusted,
+          PEP_rating_trusted_and_anonymized,
+          PEP_rating_fully_anonymous,
+
+          PEP_rating_mistrust = -1,
+          PEP_rating_b0rken = -2,
+          PEP_rating_under_attack = -3
+      } PEP_rating;
+
+

+Appendix B. Document Changelog +

+

[[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]

+

+ + +

+Appendix C. Open Issues +

+

[[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed before publication ]]

+

+ + +

Authors' Addresses

+
+
+ + Hernani Marques + + + pEp Foundation + + Oberer Graben 4 + + + CH-8400 Winterthur, + + + + Switzerland + + EMail: hernani.marques@pep.foundation + +URI: https://pep.foundation/ + +
+
+
+ + Bernie Hoeneisen + + + Ucom Standards Track Solutions GmbH + + + + CH-8046 Zuerich, + + + + Switzerland + + Phone: +41 44 500 52 40 + +EMail: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch (bernhard.hoeneisen AT ucom.ch) + +URI: https://ucom.ch/ + +
+
+ + + diff --git a/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.txt b/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..188f82c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.txt @@ -0,0 +1,728 @@ + + + + +Network Working Group H. Marques +Internet-Draft pEp Foundation +Intended status: Informational B. Hoeneisen +Expires: January 8, 2020 Ucom.ch + July 07, 2019 + + + pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating + draft-marques-pep-rating-02 + +Abstract + + In many Opportunistic Security scenarios end-to-end encryption is + automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often required to + provide the users with easy means to carry out authentication. + + Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different + peers may have a different Privacy Status, e.g., unencrypted, + encrypted and encrypted as well as authenticated. Even each message + from/to a single peer may have a different Privacy Status. + + To display the actual Privacy Status to the user, this document + defines a Privacy Rating scheme and its mapping to a traffic-light + semantics. A Privacy Status is defined on a per-message basis as + well as on a per-identity basis. The traffic-light semantics (as + color rating) allows for a clear and easily understandable + presentation to the user in order to optimize the User Experience + (UX). + + This rating system is most beneficial to Opportunistic Security + scenarios and is already implemented in several applications of + pretty Easy privacy (pEp). + +Status of This Memo + + This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the + provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. + + Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering + Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- + Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. + + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months + and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any + time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference + material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 1] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + + This Internet-Draft will expire on January 8, 2020. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the + document authors. All rights reserved. + + This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal + Provisions Relating to IETF Documents + (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of + publication of this document. Please review these documents + carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect + to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must + include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of + the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as + described in the Simplified BSD License. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 + 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 1.2. Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 2. Per-Message Privacy Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.1. Rating Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.2. Color Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 + 2.3. Surjective Mapping of Rating Codes into Color Codes . . . 6 + 2.4. Semantics of Color and Rating Codes . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 2.4.1. Red . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 + 2.4.2. No Color . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.4.3. Yellow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 2.4.4. Green . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 + 3. Per-Identity Privacy Rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 7. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 + 7.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 7.2. Current software implementing pEp . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + Appendix A. Excerpts from the pEp Reference Implementation . . . 11 + A.1. pEp rating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 + Appendix B. Document Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + Appendix C. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 2] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + +1. Introduction + + In many Opportunistic Security [RFC7435] scenarios end-to-end + encryption is automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is + often required to provide the users with easy means to carry out + authentication. + + Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different + identities may have a different Privacy Status, e.g. + + o unreliable + + o encrypted + + o encrypted and authenticated + + o mistrusted + + Even each message from or to a single peer may have a different + Privacy Status. + + To display the actual Privacy Status to the user, this document + defines a Privacy Rating scheme and its mapping to a traffic-light + semantics, i.e., a mapping to different color codes as used in a + traffic-light: + + o red + + o yellow + + o green + + o no color (or gray) + + Note: While "yellow" color is used in the context of traffic-lights + (e.g., in North America), in other parts of the world (e.g., the UK) + this is generally referred to as "orange" or "amber" lights. For the + scope of this document, "yellow", "amber", and "orange" refer to the + same semantics. + + A Privacy Status is defined on a per-message basis as well as on a + per-identity basis. The traffic-light semantics (as color rating) + allows for a clear and easily understandable presentation to the user + in order to optimize the User Experience (UX). To serve also + (color-)blind Internet users or those using monochrome displays, the + traffic light color semantics may also be presented by simple texts + and symbols for signaling the corresponding Privacy Status. + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 3] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + + The proposed definitions are already implemented and used in + applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp) [I-D.birk-pep]. This + document is targeted to applications based on the pEp framework and + Opportunistic Security [RFC7435]. However, it may be also used in + other applications as suitable. + + Note: The pEp [I-D.birk-pep] framework proposes to automatize the use + of end-to-end encryption for Internet users of email and other + messaging applications and introduces methods to easily allow + authentication. + +1.1. Requirements Language + + The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", + "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this + document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. + +1.2. Terms + + The following terms are defined for the scope of this document: + + o pEp Handshake: The process of one user contacting another over an + independent channel in order to verify Trustwords (or by fallback: + fingerprints). This can be done in-person or through established + verbal communication channels, like a phone call. + [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] + + o Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0 + to 65535) to natural language words. When doing a Handshake, + peers are shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved + to ease the comparison. [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] + + o Trust On First Use (TOFU): cf. [RFC7435], which states: "In a + protocol, TOFU calls for accepting and storing a public key or + credential associated with an asserted identity, without + authenticating that assertion. Subsequent communication that is + authenticated using the cached key or credential is secure against + an MiTM attack, if such an attack did not succeed during the + vulnerable initial communication." + + o Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: cf. [RFC4949], which states: "A + form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker intercepts + and selectively modifies communicated data to masquerade as one or + more of the entities involved in a communication association." + + + + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 4] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + +2. Per-Message Privacy Rating + +2.1. Rating Codes + + To rate messages (cf. also Appendix A.1), the following 13 Rating + codes are defined as scalar values (decimal): + + +-------------+------------------------+ + | Rating code | Rating label | + +-------------+------------------------+ + | -3 | under attack | + | | | + | -2 | broken | + | | | + | -1 | mistrust | + | | | + | 0 | undefined | + | | | + | 1 | cannot decrypt | + | | | + | 2 | have no key | + | | | + | 3 | unencrypted | + | | | + | 4 | unencrypted for some | + | | | + | 5 | unreliable | + | | | + | 6 | reliable | + | | | + | 7 | trusted | + | | | + | 8 | trusted and anonymized | + | | | + | 9 | fully anonymous | + +-------------+------------------------+ + +2.2. Color Codes + + For an Internet user to understand what the available Privacy Status + is, the following colors (traffic-light semantics) are defined: + + + + + + + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 5] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + + +------------+-------------+ + | Color code | Color label | + +------------+-------------+ + | -1 | red | + | | | + | 0 | no color | + | | | + | 1 | yellow | + | | | + | 2 | green | + +------------+-------------+ + +2.3. Surjective Mapping of Rating Codes into Color Codes + + Corresponding User Experience (UX) implementations use a surjective + mapping of the Rating Codes into the Color Codes (in traffic light + semantics) as follows: + + +--------------+------------+-------------+ + | Rating codes | Color code | Color label | + +--------------+------------+-------------+ + | -3 to -1 | -1 | red | + | | | | + | 0 to 5 | 0 | no color | + | | | | + | 6 | 1 | yellow | + | | | | + | 7 to 9 | 2 | green | + +--------------+------------+-------------+ + + This mapping is used in current pEp implementations to signal the + Privacy Status (cf. Section 7.2). + +2.4. Semantics of Color and Rating Codes + +2.4.1. Red + + The red color MUST only be used in three cases: + + o Rating code -3: A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack could be + detected. + + o Rating code -2: The message was tempered with. + + o Rating code -1: The user explicitly states he mistrusts a peer, + e.g., because a Handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] mismatched + or when the user learns the communication partner was attacked and + might have gotten the corresponding secret key leaked. + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 6] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + +2.4.2. No Color + + No specific (or a gray color) MUST be shown in the following cases: + + o Rating code 0: A message can be rendered, but the encryption + status is not clear, i.e., undefined + + o Rating code 1: A message cannot be decrypted (because of an error + not covered by rating code 2 below). + + o Rating code 2: No key is available to decrypt a message (because + it was encrypted with a public key for which no secret key could + be found). + + o Rating code 3: A message is received or sent out unencrypted + (because it was received unencrypted or there's no public key to + encrypt a message to a recipient). + + o Rating code 4: A message is sent out unencrypted for some of the + recipients of a group (because there's at least one recipient in + the group whose public key is not available to the sender). + + o Rating code 5: A message is encrypted, but cryptographic + parameters (e.g., the cryptographic method employed or key length) + are insufficient. + +2.4.3. Yellow + + o Rating code 6: Whenever a message can be encrypted or decrypted + with sufficient cryptographic parameters, it's considered + reliable. It is mapped into the yellow color code. + +2.4.4. Green + + o Rating code 7: A message is mapped into the green color code only + if a pEp handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] was successfully + carried out. + + By consequence that means, that the pEp propositions don't strictly + follow the TOFU (cf. [RFC7435]) approach, in order to avoid + signaling trust without peers verifying their channel first. + + In current pEp implementations (cf. Section 7) only rating code 7 is + achieved. + + The rating codes 8 and 9 are reserved for future use in pEp + implementations which also secure meta-data (rating code 8), by using + a peer-to-peer framework like GNUnet [GNUnet], and/or allow for fully + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 7] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + + anonymous communications (rating code 9), where sender and receiver + don't know each other, but trust between the endpoints could be + established nevertheless. + +3. Per-Identity Privacy Rating + + The same Color Codes (red, no color, yellow and green) as for + messages (cf. Section 2.2) MUST be applied for identities (peers), + so that a user can easily understand, which identities private + communication is possible with. + + The green color code MUST be applied to an identity whom the pEp + handshake [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] was successfully carried out + with. + + The yellow color code MUST be set whenever a public key could be + obtained to securely encrypt messages to an identity, although a MITM + attack cannot be excluded. + + The no color code MUST be used for the case that no public key is + available to engage in private communications with an identity. + + The red color code MUST only be used when an identity is marked as + mistrusted. + + [[ It's not yet clear if there are proper cases where it makes sense + to set an identity automatically to the red color code, as it appears + to be difficult to detect attacks (e.g., secret key leakage) at the + other endpoint with certainty. ]] + +4. Security Considerations + + [[ TODO ]] + +5. Privacy Considerations + + [[ TODO ]] + +6. IANA Considerations + + This document has no actions for IANA. + +7. Implementation Status + + + + + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 8] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + +7.1. Introduction + + This section records the status of known implementations of the + protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this + Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. + The description of implementations in this section is intended to + assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to + RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation + here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort + has been spent to verify the information presented here that was + supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not + be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their + features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may + exist. + + According to [RFC7942], "[...] this will allow reviewers and working + groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit + of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable + experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols + more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this + information as they see fit." + +7.2. Current software implementing pEp + + The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying + degrees) already exists: + + o pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release + [SRC.pepforoutlook] + + o pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release + [SRC.pepforandroid] + + o Enigmail/pEp as add-on for Mozilla Thunderbird, release + [SRC.enigmailpep] + + o pEp for iOS (implemented in a new MUA), beta [SRC.pepforios] + + pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a + commercial entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp + while Enigmail/pEp is pursued as community project, supported by the + pEp Foundation. + + All software is available as Free Software and published also in + source form. + + + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 9] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + +8. Acknowledgements + + The authors would like to thank the following people who have + provided feedback or significant contributions to the development of + this document: Leon Schumacher and Volker Birk + + This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed + and extended with funding by the Internet Society's Beyond the Net + Programme on standardizing pEp. [ISOC.bnet] + +9. References + +9.1. Normative References + + [I-D.birk-pep] + Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): + Privacy by Default", draft-birk-pep-03 (work in progress), + March 2019. + + [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate + Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, + DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, + . + + [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", + FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, + . + + [RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection + Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, + December 2014, . + +9.2. Informative References + + [GNUnet] Grothoff, C., "The GNUnet System", October 2017, + . + + [I-D.birk-pep-trustwords] + Birk, V., Marques, H., and B. Hoeneisen, "IANA + Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA + Considerations", draft-birk-pep-trustwords-03 (work in + progress), March 2019. + + [I-D.marques-pep-handshake] + Marques, H. and B. Hoeneisen, "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): + Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake", + draft-marques-pep-handshake-02 (work in progress), March + 2019. + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 10] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + + [ISOC.bnet] + Simao, I., "Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects + Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy + via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy's + protocols", June 2017, . + + [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running + Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205, + RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016, + . + + [SRC.enigmailpep] + "Source code for Enigmail/pEp", July 2019, + . + + [SRC.pepforandroid] + "Source code for pEp for Android", July 2019, + . + + [SRC.pepforios] + "Source code for pEp for iOS", July 2019, + . + + [SRC.pepforoutlook] + "Source code for pEp for Outlook", July 2019, + . + +Appendix A. Excerpts from the pEp Reference Implementation + + This section provides excerpts of the running code from the pEp + reference implementation pEp engine (C99 programming language). + +A.1. pEp rating + + From the reference implementation by the pEp foundation, src/ + message_api.h: + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 11] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + + typedef enum _PEP_rating { + PEP_rating_undefined = 0, + PEP_rating_cannot_decrypt, + PEP_rating_have_no_key, + PEP_rating_unencrypted, + PEP_rating_unencrypted_for_some, + PEP_rating_unreliable, + PEP_rating_reliable, + PEP_rating_trusted, + PEP_rating_trusted_and_anonymized, + PEP_rating_fully_anonymous, + + PEP_rating_mistrust = -1, + PEP_rating_b0rken = -2, + PEP_rating_under_attack = -3 + } PEP_rating; + +Appendix B. Document Changelog + + [[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]] + + o draft-marques-pep-rating-02: + + * Add Privacy and IANA Considerations sections + + * Updated Terms + + o draft-marques-pep-rating-01: + + * Update references + + * Minor edits + + o draft-marques-pep-rating-00: + + * Initial version + +Appendix C. Open Issues + + [[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed + before publication ]] + + o Better explain usage of Color Codes in Per-Identity Privacy Rating + + o Decide whether rating code scalars 6 and 7-9 should be raised to + leave space for future extensions + + o Add Security Considerations + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 12] + +Internet-Draft pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating July 2019 + + + o Add more source code excerpts to Appendix + + o Add rating codes for secure cryptographic methods and parameters + and reference them + +Authors' Addresses + + Hernani Marques + pEp Foundation + Oberer Graben 4 + CH-8400 Winterthur + Switzerland + + Email: hernani.marques@pep.foundation + URI: https://pep.foundation/ + + + Bernie Hoeneisen + Ucom Standards Track Solutions GmbH + CH-8046 Zuerich + Switzerland + + Phone: +41 44 500 52 40 + Email: bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch (bernhard.hoeneisen AT ucom.ch) + URI: https://ucom.ch/ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Marques & Hoeneisen Expires January 8, 2020 [Page 13] diff --git a/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.xml b/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.xml new file mode 100644 index 00000000..9f4f55ad --- /dev/null +++ b/pep-rating/archive/draft-marques-pep-rating-02.xml @@ -0,0 +1,879 @@ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating + + + pEp Foundation +
+ + Oberer Graben 4 + CH-8400 Winterthur + Switzerland + + hernani.marques@pep.foundation + https://pep.foundation/ +
+
+ + Ucom Standards Track Solutions GmbH +
+ + + CH-8046 Zuerich + Switzerland + + +41 44 500 52 40 + bernie@ietf.hoeneisen.ch (bernhard.hoeneisen AT ucom.ch) + https://ucom.ch/ +
+
+ + + + + + + + + + +In many Opportunistic Security scenarios end-to-end encryption is +automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often required to +provide the users with easy means to carry out authentication. + +Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different +peers may have a different Privacy Status, e.g., unencrypted, +encrypted and encrypted as well as authenticated. Even each message from/to +a single peer may have a different Privacy Status. + +To display the actual Privacy Status to the user, this document +defines a Privacy Rating scheme and its mapping to a traffic-light +semantics. A Privacy Status is defined on a per-message basis as well +as on a per-identity basis. The traffic-light semantics (as color rating) +allows for a clear and easily understandable presentation to the user +in order to optimize the User Experience (UX). + +This rating system is most beneficial to Opportunistic Security +scenarios and is already implemented in several applications of pretty +Easy privacy (pEp). + + + + + + +
+ + + + +
+ +In many Opportunistic Security scenarios end-to-end +encryption is automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often +required to provide the users with easy means to carry out +authentication. + +Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different +identities may have a different Privacy Status, e.g. + + + unreliable + encrypted + encrypted and authenticated + mistrusted + + +Even each message from or to a single peer may have a different +Privacy Status. + +To display the actual Privacy Status to the user, this document +defines a Privacy Rating scheme and its mapping to a traffic-light +semantics, i.e., a mapping to different color codes as used in a +traffic-light: + + + red + yellow + green + no color (or gray) + + +Note: While “yellow” color is used in the context of traffic-lights +(e.g., in North America), in other parts of the world (e.g., the UK) +this is generally referred to as “orange” or “amber” lights. For the +scope of this document, “yellow”, “amber”, and “orange” refer to the +same semantics. + +A Privacy Status is defined on a per-message basis as well as on a +per-identity basis. The traffic-light semantics (as color rating) +allows for a clear and easily understandable presentation to the user +in order to optimize the User Experience (UX). To serve also +(color-)blind Internet users or those using monochrome displays, the +traffic light color semantics may also be presented by simple texts +and symbols for signaling the corresponding Privacy Status. + +The proposed definitions are already implemented and used in +applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp) . This +document is targeted to applications based on the pEp framework and +Opportunistic Security . However, it may be also used in +other applications as suitable. + +Note: The pEp framework proposes to automatize the +use of end-to-end encryption for Internet users of email and other +messaging applications and introduces methods to easily allow +authentication. + +
+ +The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”, +“SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this +document are to be interpreted as described in . + +
+
+ +The following terms are defined for the scope of this document: + + + pEp Handshake: The process of one user contacting another over an +independent channel in order to verify Trustwords (or by fallback: +fingerprints). This can be done in-person or through established +verbal communication channels, like a phone +call. + Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0 to +65535) to natural language words. When doing a Handshake, peers are +shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved to ease the +comparison. + + + + + + Trust On First Use (TOFU): cf. , which states: “In a +protocol, TOFU calls for accepting and storing a public key or +credential associated with an asserted identity, without +authenticating that assertion. Subsequent communication that is +authenticated using the cached key or credential is secure against +an MiTM attack, if such an attack did not succeed during the +vulnerable initial communication.” + + + + + + Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack: cf. , which states: “A +form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker intercepts +and selectively modifies communicated data to masquerade as one or +more of the entities involved in a communication association.” + + +
+
+
+ +
+ +To rate messages (cf. also ), the following 13 Rating +codes are defined as scalar values (decimal): + + + Rating code + Rating label + -3 + under attack + -2 + broken + -1 + mistrust + 0 + undefined + 1 + cannot decrypt + 2 + have no key + 3 + unencrypted + 4 + unencrypted for some + 5 + unreliable + 6 + reliable + 7 + trusted + 8 + trusted and anonymized + 9 + fully anonymous + + +
+
+ +For an Internet user to understand what the available Privacy Status +is, the following colors (traffic-light semantics) are defined: + + + Color code + Color label + -1 + red + 0 + no color + 1 + yellow + 2 + green + + +
+
+ +Corresponding User Experience (UX) implementations use a surjective +mapping of the Rating Codes into the Color Codes (in traffic light +semantics) as follows: + + + Rating codes + Color code + Color label + -3 to -1 + -1 + red + 0 to 5 + 0 + no color + 6 + 1 + yellow + 7 to 9 + 2 + green + + +This mapping is used in current pEp implementations to signal the +Privacy Status (cf. ). + +
+
+ +
+ +The red color MUST only be used in three cases: + + + Rating code -3: A man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack could be detected. + Rating code -2: The message was tempered with. + Rating code -1: The user explicitly states he mistrusts a peer, +e.g., because a Handshake mismatched +or when the user learns the communication partner was attacked and might +have gotten the corresponding secret key leaked. + + +
+
+ +No specific (or a gray color) MUST be shown in the following cases: + + + Rating code 0: A message can be rendered, but the encryption status +is not clear, i.e., undefined + Rating code 1: A message cannot be decrypted (because of an error +not covered by rating code 2 below). + Rating code 2: No key is available to decrypt a message (because it +was encrypted with a public key for which no secret key could be +found). + Rating code 3: A message is received or sent out unencrypted +(because it was received unencrypted or there’s no public key to +encrypt a message to a recipient). + Rating code 4: A message is sent out unencrypted for some of the +recipients of a group (because there’s at least one recipient in +the group whose public key is not available to the sender). + Rating code 5: A message is encrypted, but cryptographic parameters +(e.g., the cryptographic method employed or key length) are +insufficient. + + +
+
+ + + Rating code 6: Whenever a message can be encrypted or decrypted with +sufficient cryptographic parameters, it’s considered reliable. It +is mapped into the yellow color code. + + +
+
+ + + Rating code 7: A message is mapped into the green color code +only if a pEp handshake was +successfully carried out. + + +By consequence that means, that the pEp propositions don’t strictly +follow the TOFU (cf. ) approach, in order to avoid +signaling trust without peers verifying their channel first. + +In current pEp implementations (cf. ) only +rating code 7 is achieved. + +The rating codes 8 and 9 are reserved for future use in pEp +implementations which also secure meta-data (rating code 8), by using +a peer-to-peer framework like GNUnet , and/or allow for +fully anonymous communications (rating code 9), where sender and +receiver don’t know each other, but trust between the endpoints could +be established nevertheless. + +
+
+
+
+ +The same Color Codes (red, no color, yellow and green) as for messages +(cf. ) MUST be applied for identities (peers), so that +a user can easily understand, which identities private communication +is possible with. + +The green color code MUST be applied to an identity whom the pEp +handshake was successfully carried out +with. + +The yellow color code MUST be set whenever a public key could be +obtained to securely encrypt messages to an identity, although a +MITM attack cannot be excluded. + +The no color code MUST be used for the case that no public key is +available to engage in private communications with an identity. + +The red color code MUST only be used when an identity is marked as +mistrusted. + +[[ It’s not yet clear if there are proper cases where it makes sense + to set an identity automatically to the red color code, as it + appears to be difficult to detect attacks (e.g., secret key + leakage) at the other endpoint with certainty. ]] + +
+
+ +[[ TODO ]] + +
+
+ +[[ TODO ]] + +
+
+ +This document has no actions for IANA. + +
+
+ +
+ +This section records the status of known implementations of the +protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this +Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in . +The description of implementations in this section is intended to +assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to +RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation +here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort +has been spent to verify the information presented here that was +supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not +be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their +features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may +exist. + +According to , “[…] this will allow reviewers and +working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the +benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable +experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols +more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this +information as they see fit.” + +
+
+ +The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying +degrees) already exists: + + + pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release + pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release + Enigmail/pEp as add-on for Mozilla Thunderbird, release + pEp for iOS (implemented in a new MUA), beta + + +pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a commercial +entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp while Enigmail/pEp +is pursued as community project, supported by the pEp Foundation. + +All software is available as Free Software and published also in source form. + +
+
+
+ +The authors would like to thank the following people who have provided +feedback or significant contributions to the development of this +document: Leon Schumacher and Volker Birk + +This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and then reviewed +and extended with funding by the Internet Society’s Beyond the Net +Programme on standardizing pEp. + +
+ + +
+ + + + + + + + + + + +Internet Security Glossary, Version 2 + + +This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations of terminology for information system security. The 334 pages of entries offer recommendations to improve the comprehensibility of written material that is generated in the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026). The recommendations follow the principles that such writing should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. This memo provides information for the Internet community. + + + + + + + + + + +Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time + + +This document defines the concept "Opportunistic Security" in the context of communications protocols. Protocol designs based on Opportunistic Security use encryption even when authentication is not available, and use authentication when possible, thereby removing barriers to the widespread use of encryption on the Internet. + + + + + + + + + +pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Privacy by Default + + + + + + + + + + + +The pretty Easy privacy (pEp) protocols describe a set of conventions for the automation of operations traditionally seen as barriers to the use and deployment of secure end-to-end interpersonal messaging. These include, but are not limited to, key management, key discovery, and private key handling (including peer-to-peer synchronization of private keys and other user data across devices). pEp also introduces means to verify communication peers and proposes a trust-rating system to denote secure types of communications and signal the privacy level available on a per-user and per-message level. Significantly, the pEp protocols build on already available security formats and message transports (e.g., PGP/MIME), and are written with the intent to be interoperable with already widely-deployed systems in order to facilitate and ease adoption and implementation. This document outlines the general design choices and principles of pEp. + + + + + + + + + + + +Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels + + +In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +IANA Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA Considerations + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +This document specifies the IANA Registration Guidelines for Trustwords, describes corresponding registration procedures, and provides a guideline for creating Trustword list specifications. Trustwords are common words in a natural language (e.g., English) to which the hexadecimal strings are mapped to. This makes verification processes (e.g., comparison of fingerprints), more practical and less prone to misunderstandings. + + + + + + + + + + + +pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake + + + + + + + + + + + +In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed; the latter to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. This document proposes a new method to easily verify a public key is authentic by a Handshake process that allows users to easily authenticate their communication channel. The new method is targeted to Opportunistic Security scenarios and is already implemented in several applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp). + + + + + + + + + + + The GNUnet System + + + + + + + + + Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy’s protocols + + + + + + + + + + + + +Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section + + + +This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice. + + + + + + + + + + Source code for pEp for Android + + + + + + + + + Source code for pEp for iOS + + + + + + + + + Source code for pEp for Outlook + + + + + + + + + Source code for Enigmail/pEp + + + + + + + + + + + +
+ +This section provides excerpts of the running code from the pEp +reference implementation pEp engine (C99 programming language). + +
+ +From the reference implementation by the pEp foundation, src/message_api.h: + +
+ +
+
+
+ +[[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]] + + + draft-marques-pep-rating-02: + + Add Privacy and IANA Considerations sections + Updated Terms + + draft-marques-pep-rating-01: + + Update references + Minor edits + + draft-marques-pep-rating-00: + + Initial version + + + +
+
+ +[[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed + before publication ]] + + + Better explain usage of Color Codes in Per-Identity Privacy Rating + Decide whether rating code scalars 6 and 7-9 should be raised to +leave space for future extensions + Add Security Considerations + Add more source code excerpts to Appendix + Add rating codes for secure cryptographic methods and parameters +and reference them + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
+ diff --git a/pep-rating/draft-marques-pep-rating.mkd b/pep-rating/draft-marques-pep-rating.mkd index 324ebe3b..69a46dab 100644 --- a/pep-rating/draft-marques-pep-rating.mkd +++ b/pep-rating/draft-marques-pep-rating.mkd @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ coding: utf-8 title: "pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating" abbrev: "pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Rating" -docname: draft-marques-pep-rating-02 +docname: draft-marques-pep-rating-03 category: info stand_alone: yes @@ -346,6 +346,7 @@ From the reference implementation by the pEp foundation, src/message_api.h: * draft-marques-pep-rating-02: * Add Privacy and IANA Considerations sections + * Updated Terms * draft-marques-pep-rating-01: * Update references