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1329 lines
61 KiB
1329 lines
61 KiB
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
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<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>
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<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc2629 version -->
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<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd" [
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]>
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<?rfc toc="yes"?>
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<?rfc sortrefs="yes"?>
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<?rfc symrefs="yes"?>
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<?rfc comments="yes"?>
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<rfc docName="draft-marques-pep-email-02" category="std">
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<front>
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<title abbrev="pretty Easy privacy (pEp) Email">pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Email Formats and Protocols</title>
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<author initials="H." surname="Marques" fullname="Hernani Marques">
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<organization>pEp Foundation</organization>
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<address>
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<postal>
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<street>Oberer Graben 4</street>
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<city>CH-8400 Winterthur</city>
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<country>Switzerland</country>
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</postal>
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<email>hernani.marques@pep.foundation</email>
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<uri>https://pep.foundation/</uri>
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</address>
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</author>
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<date year="2018" month="October" day="24"/>
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<abstract>
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<t>The pretty Easy privacy (pEp) propositions for email are based upon already
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existing email and encryption formats (i.e., PGP/MIME) and designed to allow
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for easy implementable and interoperable opportunistic encryption: this ranging
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from key distribution to mechanisms of subject encryption.</t>
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<t>The goal of pEp for email is to automatize operations in order to make
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email encryption usable by a wider range of Internet users, to achieve
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wide application of confidentiality and privacy practices in the real
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world.</t>
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<t>This document defines basic operations of pEp’s approach towards email and
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two PGP/MIME formats (pEp Email Format 1 and 2) to provide certain
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security guarantees. <!-- TODO-02: Furthermore: Bcc and message storage... --></t>
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<t>The proposed operations and formats are targeted to Opportunistic
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Security scenarios and are already implemented in several applications of
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pretty Easy privacy (pEp).</t>
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</abstract>
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</front>
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<middle>
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<section anchor="introduction" title="Introduction">
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<t>This document contains specific propositions to those parts of pretty Easy
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privacy (pEp) <xref target="I-D.birk-pep"/> that are specific to email <xref target="RFC5322"/>.</t>
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<t>All changes required for the pEp propositions on email to work just
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affect implementers of Mail User Agents (MUAs). <!-- TODO-02: i.e. those
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work without changes to MTAs... --></t>
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<t>pretty Easy privacy (pEp) for email is a proposition to both, implementers and
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Internet users, to make end-to-end encryption of emails straightforward.
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<!-- TODO-02: Needs more explanation, why to implementers ? --></t>
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<t>Whereas Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and OpenPGP <xref target="RFC4880"/> provide a
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basis for good encryption, we still miss implementations that also
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provide a sufficient level of usability for ordinary Internet users.</t>
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<t>Two users using pEp-enabled mail clients basically don’t need to do anything
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else than just writing emails.
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<!-- TODO-02: explain more, what users have to do in pre-pEp world --></t>
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<t>The following example roughly describes a typical pEp scenario:</t>
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<t><list style="numbers">
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<t>Alice – knowing nothing of Bob – just writes an email to Bob:
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this mail is sent out unencrypted. However, Alice’s public key
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is automatically attached.</t>
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<t>Bob can just reply to Alice and – as he got her public key – is
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now able to encrypt a message at this point. Through a
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color-rating (cf. <xref target="I-D.marques-pep-rating"/> Bob becomes aware of
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his message now going out in a secure fashion.</t>
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<t>As Alice receives Bob’s key, as of now she is also able to send
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secure messages to Bob.</t>
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<t>If Alice and Bob want to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
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they can engage in a Handshake <xref target="I-D.marques-pep-handshake"/>,
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comparing their so-called Trustwords <xref target="I-D.birk-pep-trustwords"/>
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and confirm this process if those match. After doing so, their
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identity rating changes to “encrypted and authenticated”
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<xref target="I-D.marques-pep-rating"/>, which (UX-wise) can be signaled, e.g.,
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using a green color rating. This color rating is also applied to
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messages (in- and outgoing).</t>
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</list></t>
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<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
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----- -----
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| A | | B |
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----- -----
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| |
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+------------------------+ +------------------------+
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| auto-generate key pair | | auto-generate key pair |
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| (if no key yet) | | (if no key yet) |
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+------------------------+ +------------------------+
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| |
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+-----------------------+ +-----------------------+
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| Privacy Status for B: | | Privacy Status for A: |
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| *Unencrypted* | | *Unencrypted* |
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+-----------------------+ +-----------------------+
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| |
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| A sends message to B (Public Key |
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| attached) / optionally signed, but |
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| NOT ENCRYPTED |
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+------------------------------------------>|
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| |
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| +-----------------------+
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| | Privacy Status for A: |
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| | *Encrypted* |
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| +-----------------------+
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| |
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| B sends message to A (Public Key |
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| attached) / signed and ENCRYPTED |
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|<------------------------------------------+
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| |
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+-----------------------+ |
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| Privacy Status for B: | |
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| *Encrypted* | |
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+-----------------------+ |
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| |
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| A and B sucessfully compare their |
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| Trustwords over an alternative channel |
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| (e.g. phone line) |
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|<-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -->|
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| |
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+-----------------------+ +-----------------------+
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| Privacy Status for B: | | Privacy Status for A: |
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| *Trusted* | | *Trusted* |
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+-----------------------+ +-----------------------+
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| |
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]]></artwork></figure>
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<t>This workflow is implemented as running code already in various pEp-enabled
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software, cf. <xref target="implementation-status"/>.</t>
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<t>Note: No propositions are made at this point in time that would
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require implementers to change the behavior or feature set of email
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servers. Another Internet-Draft may propose changes to the Simple Mail
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Transfer Protocol (SMTP) <xref target="RFC5321"/> as to allow for onion routing of
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email messages in a way metadata can be furtherly protected for
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communication peers – achievable by message encapsulation. pEp’s
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email message format 2 described below is already prepared for this
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scenario.</t>
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</section>
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<section anchor="terms" title="Terms">
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<t>The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”,
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“SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this
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document are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119"/>.</t>
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<t><list style="symbols">
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<t>Handshake: The process when Alice – e.g. in-person or via phone –
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contacts Bob to verify Trustwords (or by fallback: fingerprints) is
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called Handshake. <xref target="I-D.marques-pep-handshake"/></t>
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<t>Trustwords: A scalar-to-word representation of 16-bit numbers (0 to
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65535) to natural language words. When doing a Handshake, peers are
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shown combined Trustwords of both public keys involved to ease the
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comparison. <xref target="I-D.birk-pep-trustwords"/></t>
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<t>Trust on First Use (TOFU): cf. <xref target="RFC7435"/></t>
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<t>Man-in-the-middle attack (MITM): cf. <xref target="RFC4949"/></t>
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</list></t>
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</section>
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<section anchor="opportunistic-security-with-pep-for-email" title="Opportunistic Security with pEp for email">
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<section anchor="automatic-keypair-generation" title="Automatic keypair generation">
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<t>For every email account a user has in a pEp-enabled Mail User Agent (MUA),
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a different keypair SHOULD be used by default. If there are no keys whatsoever,
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RSA-4096 keypairs for OpenPGP encryption <xref target="RFC4880"/> SHOULD be generated
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automatically for each email account. However, the key length MUST be at
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least RSA-2048.</t>
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<t>If for an identity there’s an RSA keypair with less than 2048 bits, new keys
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MUST be generated.</t>
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<t>[[ TODO: Shouldn’t this go to general I-D ]]</t>
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</section>
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<section anchor="key-distribution" title="Key Distribution">
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<t>By default, public keys MUST always be attached to any outgoing message.</t>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section anchor="encryption-of-email-header-fields-and-interoperability" title="Encryption of email header fields and interoperability">
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<t>In pEp, implementers MUST put privacy first: email metadata
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(i.e., headers) MUST either be omitted or encrypted whenever
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possible.</t>
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<t>In case of email header encryption: implementers of pEp SHOULD
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be liberal in accepting other approaches to encrypt email headers, but
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MUST use the strict and interoperable pEp formats for any outgoing
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communication.</t>
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</section>
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<section anchor="pep-message-formats-for-email" title="pEp message formats for email">
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<t>The pEp message formats 1 and 2 (as described in the following) are
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email security formats used for sending signed and encrypted emails
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whenever public key(s) for the recipient(s) exist.</t>
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<section anchor="unencrypted-plain-text-message-with-public-key-attached" title="Unencrypted plain text message with public key attached">
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<t>If for a recipient there’s no public key available, a pEp message MUST
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be sent out in plain text as MIME message version 1, with
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“Content-Type: multipart/mixed” and the OpenPGP public key attached in
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ASCII armored format, named “pEpkey.asc”.</t>
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<t>For a MUA implementer this fulfills two functions:</t>
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<t><list style="numbers">
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<t>It can be easily detected that the sender is a pEp user.</t>
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<t>The MUA (if at least OpenPGP-enabled) can enable the
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receiving user to import the public key to engage in
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end-to-end encryption with the sender; a MUA implementer
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can also decide to automatically import the key such that
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the user can immediately engage in opportunistic encryption.</t>
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</list></t>
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<t>The plain text messages SHOULD be sent out with the UTF-8 charset
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Content-Type set.</t>
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<section anchor="example" title="Example">
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<t>Please note that in the following examples the “pEpkey.asc” attachments
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encoded in base64 format are only shown in its first and last line
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(and otherwise shortened by three points).
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<!-- TODO-02: Move up, as it covers all examples; applies also
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to other attachment types --></t>
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<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
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From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
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To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
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Subject: Test
|
|
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
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boundary="----3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6"
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
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------3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
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Content-Type: text/plain;
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charset=UTF-8
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Test
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------3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6
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Content-Type: application/pgp-keys;
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name="pEpkey.asc"
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
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Content-Disposition: attachment;
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filename="pEpkey.asc";
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size=3813
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|
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LS0tLS1CRUdJTiBQR1AgUFVCTElDIEtFWSBCTE9DSy0tLS0tCgptUUlOQkZxNWlkd
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...
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SUXFhQT09Cj1adlFnCi0tLS0tRU5EIFBHUCBQVUJMSUMgS0VZIEJMT0NLLS0tLS0K
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------3YNFBU8B6LV244ZJNQZL12LVUAPGG6--
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]]></artwork></figure>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section anchor="pep-email-format-version-1" title="pEp email format version 1">
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<t>pEp email format 1 is an encrypted and signed PGP/MIME format, which by
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default ensures:</t>
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<t><list style="symbols">
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<t>correctly signed messages</t>
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<t>delivery of public keys (at least and automatically: the sender’s
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public key)</t>
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</list></t>
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<t>By default, when a public key for a peer is available,
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pEp-capable MUAs are REQUIRED to send out email messages
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according to <xref target="RFC5322"/> and in PGP/MIME format <xref target="RFC3156"/>
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with the informational “Subject:” header field set to “pEp”,
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as follows:</t>
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<t><list style='empty'>
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<t>Subject: pEp</t>
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</list></t>
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<t>In turn, the intended human-readable subject (in pEp called short message)
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MUST be moved to the body of the message (in pEp called long
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message) and appear as the first line there. pEp implementers are REQUIRED to
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display the intended “Subject:” field as the real subject line in the
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respective MUAs to help users to easily grasp the real subject.</t>
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<t>Alternatively, the “Subject:” header field can also be set to its
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UTF-8 variant with “pEp” written with the equivalence symbol instead
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of an “E”:</t>
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<t><list style='empty'>
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<t>Subject: =?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=</t>
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</list></t>
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<t>Additionally, a header field “X-Pep-Version: 1.0” is added to
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signal compatibility with pEp email format to pEp-enabled MUAs.
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<!-- TODO-02: Same for X-Pep-Version: 2.0 further below --></t>
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<section anchor="example-1" title="Example 1">
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<t>Example. Using the well-known example of <xref target="RFC5322"/>, an email message sent out
|
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with pEp in message format 1 looks like this:</t>
|
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|
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<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
|
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From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
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Sender: Michael Jones <mjones@machine.example>
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To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
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Subject: pEp
|
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Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2018 09:55:06 +0200
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Message-ID: <1234@local.machine.example>
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MIME-Version: 1.0
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Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
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boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B"
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Content-Language: en-us
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X-Pep-Version: 1.0
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|
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This is a multipart message in MIME format.
|
|
|
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------=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B
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Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
|
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
|
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|
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-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
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hQIMAwusnBHN80H+AQ//cJLQLOl+6hOofKEkQJeu0wedmwt+TkzPx/sCUQ80dzLv
|
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...
|
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j/ES8ndDBftM5mZLzFQ2VatqB9G9cqCgiOVFs6jfTI13nPfLit9IPWRavcVIMdwt
|
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Xd9bdvHx/ReenAk/
|
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=7WaL
|
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-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
|
|
|
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------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450
|
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Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="pEpkey.asc"
|
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Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
|
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Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pEpkey.asc"
|
|
|
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-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
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mQINBFQRqIcBEACpsz3mK1zqPdqDlxU6Yws/Xz14LJpszDLlKJckpa7hSc9jfZ4Q
|
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...
|
|
Ag7IIk/Gj628hYTdCpNCUc9b1vS6xMAkxJWYgNVwLFS2goikEHCiyzDe
|
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=MicJ
|
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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
|
|
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------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450--
|
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|
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]]></artwork></figure>
|
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|
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</section>
|
|
<section anchor="example-2" title="Example 2">
|
|
|
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<t>Using the UTF-8 variant of writing “pEp” with the equivalence symbol, and
|
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an additional document attached (an example PDF attachment), an OpenPGP-signed
|
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and -encrypted pEp email would look like the following:</t>
|
|
|
|
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
|
|
From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
|
|
Sender: Michael Jones <mjones@machine.example>
|
|
To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
|
|
Subject: =?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=
|
|
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2018 09:55:06 +0200
|
|
Message-ID: <1234@local.machine.example>
|
|
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
|
|
boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B"
|
|
Content-Language: en-us
|
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X-Pep-Version: 1.0
|
|
|
|
This is a multipart message in MIME format.
|
|
|
|
------=_NextPart_000_0016_01D0E64A.33EC31B
|
|
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
|
|
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
|
|
|
|
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
|
|
hQIMAwusnBHN80H+AQ//cJLQLOl+6hOofKEkQJeu0wedmwt+TkzPx/sCUQ80dzLv
|
|
...
|
|
j/ES8ndDBftM5mZLzFQ2VatqB9G9cqCgiOVFs6jfTI13nPfLit9IPWRavcVIMdwt
|
|
Xd9bdvHx/ReenAk/
|
|
=7WaL
|
|
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
|
|
|
|
------=_NextPart_000_003A_01D10CF6.2DA15150
|
|
Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="example.pdf.pgp"
|
|
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
|
|
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="example.pdf.pgp"
|
|
|
|
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
|
|
hQIMA/bohV/mG7k7ARAAyy+sdpZYZBhUH/p0gJ+wIlEGTTG2rjLpLuixBrm5Cuj3
|
|
...
|
|
oAXrQJJgD0F3Ung24Kkundua2gSa9cyeYvUXtA2mbXT7YyN7RdxrMFNfdVFqXZEc
|
|
pXqIjL2uKBbyjpS44fc3GmOZNih3bI6q8nl/
|
|
=Mvna
|
|
|
|
------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450
|
|
Content-Type: application/pgp-keys; name="pEpkey.asc"
|
|
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
|
|
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pEpkey.asc"
|
|
|
|
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
|
mQINBFQRqIcBEACpsz3mK1zqPdqDlxU6Yws/Xz14LJpszDLlKJckpa7hSc9jfZ4Q
|
|
...
|
|
Ag7IIk/Gj628hYTdCpNCUc9b1vS6xMAkxJWYgNVwLFS2goikEHCiyzDe
|
|
=MicJ
|
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-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
|
|
|
------=_NextPart_000_0060_01D0EAEF.2D54F450--
|
|
]]></artwork></figure>
|
|
|
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</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="pep-email-format-version-2" title="pEp email format version 2">
|
|
|
|
<t>pEp email format 2 is a strict PGP/MIME format, which by default ensures:</t>
|
|
|
|
<t><list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>correctly signed messages</t>
|
|
<t>delivery of public keys (at least: the sender’s public key)</t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
|
|
<t>In pEp email format 2 the actual email is encapsulated by an outside
|
|
multipart/encrypted message (i.e., the actual email is sent like a forwarded
|
|
message).</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>Headers of messages (received, to be forwarded etc.) can thus be preserved
|
|
in the inner message, which is OpenPGP-signed and -encrypted by the
|
|
application/pgp-encrypted “Content-Type”.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>In the outer message, unnecessary email headers MUST be omitted to the
|
|
fullest extent.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>In contrast to pEp email format 1, the public key and other files attached
|
|
cannot be seen in the MIME tree. The only part which can be seen is an
|
|
application/octet-stream “Content-Type” with name “msg.asc”.</t>
|
|
|
|
<!-- TODO: not a sentence / sth is missing here
|
|
|
|
or the sender's public key is considered as modification and shown as
|
|
attack.
|
|
|
|
-->
|
|
|
|
<section anchor="example-outer-and-inner-message" title="Example (Outer and Inner Message)">
|
|
|
|
<t>A pEp email format 2 message, with the “Subject:” header field set to
|
|
“pEp” looks like the following (please note that the inner message is
|
|
fully contained in the OpenPGP-signed and -encrypted file named “msg.asc”,
|
|
including possible attachments and with the sender’s public key as
|
|
“pEpkey.asc” attached at the very end):</t>
|
|
|
|
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
|
|
From: John Doe <jdoe@machine.example>
|
|
Sender: Michael Jones <mjones@machine.example>
|
|
To: Mary Smith <mary@example.net>
|
|
Subject: =?utf-8?Q?p=E2=89=A1p?=
|
|
Date: Fri, 30 Jun 2018 09:55:06 +0200
|
|
Message-ID: <1234@local.machine.example>
|
|
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
Subject: pEp
|
|
X-Pep-Version: 2.0
|
|
Content-Type: multipart/encrypted;
|
|
boundary="261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb";
|
|
protocol="application/pgp-encrypted"
|
|
|
|
--261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb
|
|
Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted
|
|
|
|
Version: 1
|
|
--261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb
|
|
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
|
|
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
|
|
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="msg.asc"
|
|
|
|
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
|
|
|
|
hQGMAzDKu5MiiyCzAQv9Edg8ulxgxyQfiZRxOpThL0aMFkK7JZH7AJfgdxunLAJk
|
|
...
|
|
a2jDdzNxotItZk8tWW2h/REdKtRMyXg633DyFLbsIx+cCMnMR1NDChCzvyzUjAw6
|
|
XeCGXnY3LB1K
|
|
=sdgE
|
|
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
|
|
|
|
--261a304d18692673570d913f7e24b8cb--
|
|
]]></artwork></figure>
|
|
|
|
<t>The inner message in a simple form without further nesting might look
|
|
like the following, when decrypted:</t>
|
|
|
|
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
|
|
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
|
Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
|
|
boundary="17d3c87b380049a821c764604aaf9272"
|
|
|
|
--17d3c87b380049a821c764604aaf9272
|
|
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
|
|
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
|
|
Content-Disposition: inline; filename="msg.txt"
|
|
|
|
Subject: The real encrypted subject
|
|
|
|
Hello, there!
|
|
|
|
--17d3c87b380049a821c764604aaf9272
|
|
Content-Type: application/pgp-keys
|
|
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="pEpkey.asc"
|
|
|
|
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
|
mQGNBFmwE70BDACyR/yQ48QSaQAZyvyUgp7f/4WXxiX1OS9vC/UuewdGLosvl3G+
|
|
...
|
|
A0KQ6HDwLFuLzneg6Nse4pX0hNWGbLNCouYKdL3vfUHokqp/MTzxyPQlOadDHrDV
|
|
H9RC4kMrB/ONGe5yn+u4zjrgq9gWCbdJ43fMoiU3lfMIKy5sZ2NPzh9l
|
|
=p5bZ
|
|
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
|
|
]]></artwork></figure>
|
|
|
|
<t>It does not only carry the encrypted subject, which pEp implementers are
|
|
supposed to map (UX-wise) such as to replace the “pEp” subject in the
|
|
outer message, but also the actual message (as inline file named “msg.txt”
|
|
in case of plain text) as well as the sender’s public key.</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="rendering-incoming-messages-and-message-rating" title="Rendering Incoming Messages and Message Rating">
|
|
|
|
<t>pEp-enabled clients MUST NOT blindly render messages. Special care MUST
|
|
be taken when rendering the pEp email formats, which provide certain
|
|
guarantees:</t>
|
|
|
|
<!-- ORIGINAL
|
|
| Message Format | Error State | Render | Status Code |
|
|
| PGP/MIME | Unsigned | Yes | DECRYPTED_BUT_UNSIGNED |
|
|
| | Signed, no key | Yes | NO_KEY_FOR_SIGNER |
|
|
| | Bad signature | No | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
|
|
| pEp Email 1.0 | Unsigned | No | DECRYPTED_BUT_UNSIGNED |
|
|
| | Signed, no key | No | NO_KEY_FOR_SIGNER |
|
|
| | Bad signature | No | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
|
|
| pEp Email 2.0 | Unsigned | No | MODIFICATION_DETECTED |
|
|
| | Signed, no key | No | MODIFICATION_DETECTED |
|
|
| | Bad signature | No | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
|
|
-->
|
|
|
|
<figure><artwork><![CDATA[
|
|
+--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+
|
|
| Message | Error State | Render | Status Code |
|
|
| Format | | | |
|
|
+--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+
|
|
| PGP/MIME | Unsigned | Yes | DECRYPTED_BUT_UNSIGNED |
|
|
| | Signed, no key | Yes | NO_KEY_FOR_SIGNER |
|
|
| | Bad signature | No | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
|
|
+--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+
|
|
| pEp Email | Unsigned | No | DECRYPTED_BUT_UNSIGNED |
|
|
| 1.0 | Signed, no key | No | NO_KEY_FOR_SIGNER |
|
|
| | Bad signature | No | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
|
|
+--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+
|
|
| pEp Email | Unsigned | No | MODIFICATION_DETECTED |
|
|
| 2.0 | Signed, no key | No | MODIFICATION_DETECTED |
|
|
| | Bad signature | No | SIGNATURE_DOES_NOT_MATCH |
|
|
+--------------+----------------+--------+--------------------------+
|
|
]]></artwork></figure>
|
|
|
|
<t>For cases where messages appear unsigned, signed without a key or with a
|
|
bad signature, pEp’s privacy rating can be employed to signal issues to
|
|
a user in an easily understandable manner, cf. <xref target="I-D.marques-pep-rating"/>.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>[[TODO: This needs more work to be understandable. ]]</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="encryption-to-bcc-recipients" title="Encryption to Bcc recipients">
|
|
|
|
<!-- TODO-02: Describe Problem you are trying to solve! -->
|
|
|
|
<section anchor="algorithm" title="Algorithm">
|
|
|
|
<t>For encryption of emails that contain Bcc recipients a simple
|
|
algorithm MAY be used.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>Recipients MUST be partitioned into three lists, one for each of three
|
|
possible outgoing messages:</t>
|
|
|
|
<t><list style="numbers">
|
|
<t>To and Cc recipients (without Bcc recipients)
|
|
<!-- TODO-02: why is there no such difference in To/CC?--></t>
|
|
<t>Bcc recipients unable to encrypt</t>
|
|
<t>Bcc recipients able to encrypt</t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
|
|
<t>It’s RECOMMENDED that if the original message the user drafted is
|
|
saved in the user’s sent folder, that all recipient
|
|
fields (“To:”, “Cc:”, “Bcc:”) be preserved.</t>
|
|
|
|
<section anchor="split-to-and-cc-recipients-from-bcc-recipients" title="Split To and Cc recipients from Bcc recipients">
|
|
|
|
<t>To and Cc recipients MUST be split from the Bcc recipients.</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="split-bcc-recipients-in-two-groups" title="Split Bcc recipients in two groups">
|
|
|
|
<t>Bcc recipients MUST be split in two groups:</t>
|
|
|
|
<t><list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>First group of Bcc recipients who will receive clear text emails.</t>
|
|
<t>Second group of Bcc recipients who are able to receive encrypted emails.</t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="send-one-email-with-only-tocc-recipients" title="Send one email with only To/Cc recipients">
|
|
|
|
<t>The original email the user drafted SHOULD be sent out with the “Bcc:” field
|
|
removed.</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="send-one-bcc-email-for-the-first-bcc-group" title="Send one Bcc email for the first Bcc group">
|
|
|
|
<t>For the first Bcc group, a regular email message with only Bcc recipients is sent.</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="send-individual-bcc-emails-for-the-second-group" title="Send individual Bcc emails for the second group">
|
|
|
|
<t>For the second group, individual Bcc email messages are sent.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>[[TODO: This needs more work to make it better understandable. ]]</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="saving-messages" title="Saving messages">
|
|
<t>[[ TODO: Shouldn’t this go to general []</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>In accordance to the Privacy by Default principle, messages sent
|
|
or received in encrypted form SHALL be saved with the peer’s
|
|
respective public key.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>Messages sent or received in unencrypted form, SHOULD NOT be saved
|
|
in encrypted form on the mail server: this reflects the Privacy Status
|
|
the user encountered when sending or receiving the email and thus meets
|
|
the user’s expectations.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>Instead, message drafts MUST always be saved with the user’s public key.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>Other messages sent and received MUST be saved encrypted by default: for
|
|
most end-user scenarios, the servers users work with, are considered
|
|
untrusted.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>For trusted environments (e.g., in organizations) and to conform to legally
|
|
binding regulations, pEp implementations MUST provide a “Trusted Server”
|
|
option. With the user’s explicit consent (opt-in), unencrypted copies of the
|
|
messages SHALL be held on the mail servers controlled by the organization.
|
|
This can also help end-users to archive their emails without needing access to
|
|
any key material.</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="security-considerations" title="Security Considerations">
|
|
|
|
<t>[[ TODO ]]</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="implementation-status" title="Implementation Status">
|
|
|
|
<section anchor="introduction-1" title="Introduction">
|
|
|
|
<t>This section records the status of known implementations of the
|
|
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
|
|
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in <xref target="RFC7942"/>.
|
|
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
|
|
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
|
|
RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
|
|
here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort
|
|
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
|
|
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
|
|
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
|
|
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
|
|
exist.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>According to <xref target="RFC7942"/>, “[…] this will allow reviewers and
|
|
working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the
|
|
benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable
|
|
experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols
|
|
more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this
|
|
information as they see fit.”</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="current-software-implementing-pep" title="Current software implementing pEp">
|
|
|
|
<t>The following software implementing the pEp protocols (to varying
|
|
degrees) already exists:</t>
|
|
|
|
<t><list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>pEp for Outlook as add-on for Microsoft Outlook, release <xref target="SRC.pepforoutlook"/></t>
|
|
<t>pEp for Android (based on a fork of the K9 MUA), release <xref target="SRC.pepforandroid"/></t>
|
|
<t>Enigmail/pEp as add-on for Mozilla Thunderbird, release <xref target="SRC.enigmailpep"/></t>
|
|
<t>pEp for iOS (implemented in a new MUA), beta <xref target="SRC.pepforios"/></t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
|
|
<t>pEp for Android, iOS and Outlook are provided by pEp Security, a commercial
|
|
entity specializing in end-user software implementing pEp while Enigmail/pEp
|
|
is pursued as community project, supported by the pEp Foundation.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>All software is available as Free Software and published also in source form.</t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="acknowledgements" title="Acknowledgements">
|
|
|
|
<t>Special thanks go to Krista Bennet and Volker Birk for the reference
|
|
implementation on pEp and the ideas leading to this draft.</t>
|
|
|
|
<t>This work was initially created by pEp Foundation, and will be reviewed and
|
|
extended with funding by the Internet Society’s Beyond the Net Programme on
|
|
standardizing pEp. <xref target="ISOC.bnet"/></t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
|
|
</middle>
|
|
|
|
<back>
|
|
|
|
<references title='Normative References'>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC2119" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
|
|
<author initials='S.' surname='Bradner' fullname='S. Bradner'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='1997' month='March' />
|
|
<abstract><t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='14'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2119'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC2119'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC3156" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3156'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>MIME Security with OpenPGP</title>
|
|
<author initials='M.' surname='Elkins' fullname='M. Elkins'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='D.' surname='Del Torto' fullname='D. Del Torto'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='R.' surname='Levien' fullname='R. Levien'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='T.' surname='Roessler' fullname='T. Roessler'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='2001' month='August' />
|
|
<abstract><t>This document describes how the OpenPGP Message Format can be used to provide privacy and authentication using the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) security content types described in RFC 1847. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3156'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC3156'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC4949" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Internet Security Glossary, Version 2</title>
|
|
<author initials='R.' surname='Shirey' fullname='R. Shirey'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='2007' month='August' />
|
|
<abstract><t>This Glossary provides definitions, abbreviations, and explanations of terminology for information system security. The 334 pages of entries offer recommendations to improve the comprehensibility of written material that is generated in the Internet Standards Process (RFC 2026). The recommendations follow the principles that such writing should (a) use the same term or definition whenever the same concept is mentioned; (b) use terms in their plainest, dictionary sense; (c) use terms that are already well-established in open publications; and (d) avoid terms that either favor a particular vendor or favor a particular technology or mechanism over other, competing techniques that already exist or could be developed. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='FYI' value='36'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4949'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4949'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC5322" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5322'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Internet Message Format</title>
|
|
<author initials='P.' surname='Resnick' fullname='P. Resnick' role='editor'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='2008' month='October' />
|
|
<abstract><t>This document specifies the Internet Message Format (IMF), a syntax for text messages that are sent between computer users, within the framework of "electronic mail" messages. This specification is a revision of Request For Comments (RFC) 2822, which itself superseded Request For Comments (RFC) 822, "Standard for the Format of ARPA Internet Text Messages", updating it to reflect current practice and incorporating incremental changes that were specified in other RFCs. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5322'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC5322'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC7435" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time</title>
|
|
<author initials='V.' surname='Dukhovni' fullname='V. Dukhovni'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='2014' month='December' />
|
|
<abstract><t>This document defines the concept "Opportunistic Security" in the context of communications protocols. Protocol designs based on Opportunistic Security use encryption even when authentication is not available, and use authentication when possible, thereby removing barriers to the widespread use of encryption on the Internet.</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7435'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7435'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="I-D.birk-pep">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Privacy by Default</title>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='V' surname='Birk' fullname='Volker Birk'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='H' surname='Marques' fullname='Hernani Marques'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='S' surname='Shelburn' fullname='Shelburn'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<date month='June' day='26' year='2018' />
|
|
|
|
<abstract><t>Building on already available security formats and message transports (like PGP/MIME for email), and with the intention to stay interoperable to systems widespreadly deployed, pretty Easy privacy (pEp) describes protocols to automatize operations (key management, key discovery, private key handling including peer-to-peer synchronization of private keys and other user data across devices) that have been seen to be barriers to deployment of end-to-end secure interpersonal messaging. pEp also relies on "Trustwords" (as a word mapping of of fingerprints) to verify communication peers and proposes a trust rating system to denote secure types of communications and signal the privacy level available on a per-user and per-message level. In this document, the general design choices and principles of pEp are outlined.</t></abstract>
|
|
|
|
</front>
|
|
|
|
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-birk-pep-02' />
|
|
<format type='TXT'
|
|
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-birk-pep-02.txt' />
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="I-D.marques-pep-handshake">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Contact and Channel Authentication through Handshake</title>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='H' surname='Marques' fullname='Hernani Marques'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='B' surname='Hoeneisen' fullname='Bernie Hoeneisen'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<date month='June' day='29' year='2018' />
|
|
|
|
<abstract><t>In interpersonal messaging end-to-end encryption means for public key distribution and verification of its authenticity are needed; the latter to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. This document proposes a new method to easily verify a public key is authentic by a Handshake process that allows users to easily verify their communication channel. The new method is targeted to Opportunistic Security scenarios and is already implemented in several applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp).</t></abstract>
|
|
|
|
</front>
|
|
|
|
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-marques-pep-handshake-00' />
|
|
<format type='TXT'
|
|
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-marques-pep-handshake-00.txt' />
|
|
</reference>
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
</references>
|
|
|
|
<references title='Informative References'>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC4880" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4880'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>OpenPGP Message Format</title>
|
|
<author initials='J.' surname='Callas' fullname='J. Callas'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='L.' surname='Donnerhacke' fullname='L. Donnerhacke'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='H.' surname='Finney' fullname='H. Finney'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='D.' surname='Shaw' fullname='D. Shaw'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='R.' surname='Thayer' fullname='R. Thayer'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='2007' month='November' />
|
|
<abstract><t>This document is maintained in order to publish all necessary information needed to develop interoperable applications based on the OpenPGP format. It is not a step-by-step cookbook for writing an application. It describes only the format and methods needed to read, check, generate, and write conforming packets crossing any network. It does not deal with storage and implementation questions. It does, however, discuss implementation issues necessary to avoid security flaws.</t><t>OpenPGP software uses a combination of strong public-key and symmetric cryptography to provide security services for electronic communications and data storage. These services include confidentiality, key management, authentication, and digital signatures. This document specifies the message formats used in OpenPGP. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4880'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4880'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC5321" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Simple Mail Transfer Protocol</title>
|
|
<author initials='J.' surname='Klensin' fullname='J. Klensin'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='2008' month='October' />
|
|
<abstract><t>This document is a specification of the basic protocol for Internet electronic mail transport. It consolidates, updates, and clarifies several previous documents, making all or parts of most of them obsolete. It covers the SMTP extension mechanisms and best practices for the contemporary Internet, but does not provide details about particular extensions. Although SMTP was designed as a mail transport and delivery protocol, this specification also contains information that is important to its use as a "mail submission" protocol for "split-UA" (User Agent) mail reading systems and mobile environments. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5321'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC5321'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="RFC7942" target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942'>
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Improving Awareness of Running Code: The Implementation Status Section</title>
|
|
<author initials='Y.' surname='Sheffer' fullname='Y. Sheffer'><organization /></author>
|
|
<author initials='A.' surname='Farrel' fullname='A. Farrel'><organization /></author>
|
|
<date year='2016' month='July' />
|
|
<abstract><t>This document describes a simple process that allows authors of Internet-Drafts to record the status of known implementations by including an Implementation Status section. This will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.</t><t>This process is not mandatory. Authors of Internet-Drafts are encouraged to consider using the process for their documents, and working groups are invited to think about applying the process to all of their protocol specifications. This document obsoletes RFC 6982, advancing it to a Best Current Practice.</t></abstract>
|
|
</front>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='BCP' value='205'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7942'/>
|
|
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7942'/>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="I-D.birk-pep-trustwords">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>IANA Registration of Trustword Lists: Guide, Template and IANA Considerations</title>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='V' surname='Birk' fullname='Volker Birk'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='H' surname='Marques' fullname='Hernani Marques'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='B' surname='Hoeneisen' fullname='Bernie Hoeneisen'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<date month='June' day='26' year='2018' />
|
|
|
|
<abstract><t>This document specifies the IANA Registration Guidelines for Trustwords, describes corresponding registration procedures, and provides a guideline for creating Trustword list specifications. Trustwords are common words in a natural language (e.g., English) to which the hexadecimal strings are mapped to. This makes verification processes (e.g., comparison of fingerprints), more practical and less prone to misunderstandings.</t></abstract>
|
|
|
|
</front>
|
|
|
|
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-birk-pep-trustwords-02' />
|
|
<format type='TXT'
|
|
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-birk-pep-trustwords-02.txt' />
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="I-D.marques-pep-rating">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>pretty Easy privacy (pEp): Mapping of Privacy Rating</title>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='H' surname='Marques' fullname='Hernani Marques'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<author initials='B' surname='Hoeneisen' fullname='Bernie Hoeneisen'>
|
|
<organization />
|
|
</author>
|
|
|
|
<date month='July' day='2' year='2018' />
|
|
|
|
<abstract><t>In many Opportunistic Security scenarios end-to-end encryption is automatized for Internet users. In addition, it is often required to provide the users with easy means to carry out authentication. Depending on several factors, each communication channel to different peers may have a different Privacy Status, e.g., unencrypted, encrypted and encrypted as well as authenticated. Even each message from/to a single peer may have a different Privacy Status. To display the actual Privacy Status to the user, this document defines a Privacy Rating scheme and its mapping to a traffic-light semantics. A Privacy Status is defined on a per-message basis as well as on a per-identity basis. The traffic-light semantics (as color rating) allows for a clear and easily understandable presentation to the user in order to optimize the User Experience (UX). This rating system is most beneficial to Opportunistic Security scenarios and is already implemented in several applications of pretty Easy privacy (pEp).</t></abstract>
|
|
|
|
</front>
|
|
|
|
<seriesInfo name='Internet-Draft' value='draft-marques-pep-rating-00' />
|
|
<format type='TXT'
|
|
target='http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-marques-pep-rating-00.txt' />
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<reference anchor="SRC.pepforandroid" target="https://pep-security.lu/gitlab/android/pep">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Source code for pEp for Android</title>
|
|
<author >
|
|
<organization></organization>
|
|
</author>
|
|
<date year="2018" month="July"/>
|
|
</front>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
<reference anchor="SRC.pepforios" target="https://pep-security.ch/dev/repos/pEp_for_iOS/">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Source code for pEp for iOS</title>
|
|
<author >
|
|
<organization></organization>
|
|
</author>
|
|
<date year="2018" month="July"/>
|
|
</front>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
<reference anchor="SRC.pepforoutlook" target="https://pep-security.lu/dev/repos/pEp_for_Outlook/">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Source code for pEp for Outlook</title>
|
|
<author >
|
|
<organization></organization>
|
|
</author>
|
|
<date year="2018" month="July"/>
|
|
</front>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
<reference anchor="SRC.enigmailpep" target="https://enigmail.net/index.php/en/download/source-code">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Source code for Enigmail/pEp</title>
|
|
<author >
|
|
<organization></organization>
|
|
</author>
|
|
<date year="2018" month="July"/>
|
|
</front>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
<reference anchor="ISOC.bnet" target="https://www.internetsociety.org/blog/2017/06/12-innovative-projects-selected-for-beyond-the-net-funding/">
|
|
<front>
|
|
<title>Beyond the Net. 12 Innovative Projects Selected for Beyond the Net Funding. Implementing Privacy via Mass Encryption: Standardizing pretty Easy privacy’s protocols</title>
|
|
<author initials="I." surname="Simao" fullname="Ilda Simao">
|
|
<organization></organization>
|
|
</author>
|
|
<date year="2017" month="June"/>
|
|
</front>
|
|
</reference>
|
|
|
|
|
|
</references>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<section anchor="document-changelog" title="Document Changelog">
|
|
|
|
<t>[[ RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication ]]</t>
|
|
|
|
<t><list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>draft-marques-pep-email-02:
|
|
<list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>Add illustrations</t>
|
|
<t>Minor fixes</t>
|
|
<t>Add longer list of Open Issues (mainly by Bernie Hoeneisen)</t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
<t>draft-marques-pep-email-01:
|
|
<list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>Remove an artefact, fix typos and minor editorial changes;
|
|
no changes in content</t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
<t>draft-marques-pep-email-00:
|
|
<list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>Initial version</t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
<section anchor="open-issues" title="Open Issues">
|
|
|
|
<t>[[ RFC Editor: This section should be empty and is to be removed
|
|
before publication ]]</t>
|
|
|
|
<t><list style="symbols">
|
|
<t>Ship better example of pEp Message Format 2</t>
|
|
<t>Elaborate on omitting headers and better explain pEp Message Format 2</t>
|
|
<t>Add notes on EFAIL</t>
|
|
<t>Describe KeyImport to induce the import from secret keys from other devices</t>
|
|
<t>Describe / Reference KeySync (and other sync, through IMAP)</t>
|
|
<t>Add keypair revocation strategy</t>
|
|
<t>Better describe required MIME fields and parameters to set for the
|
|
pEp email formats</t>
|
|
<t>Create clearer relations to the pEp rating draft (draft-marques-pep-rating),
|
|
as this plays an important role in how messages are rendered and how they
|
|
need to be presented (after rating) for a user to have awareness about his
|
|
privacy status in any given situation.</t>
|
|
<t>Make document more coherent: check with pEp’s general draft pieces to fill on
|
|
both sides and how to reference them vice-versa.</t>
|
|
<t>Add existence of internally exposed X-EncStatus header field after decrypt
|
|
and for Trusted Server situations / mirrors and describe operations.</t>
|
|
<t>Add references to
|
|
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-melnikov-smime-header-signing-05.txt
|
|
and https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-schaad-rfc5751-bis, as well as
|
|
align text with those (e.g. forwarded=no)</t>
|
|
<t>Fix wrong stuff around pEp Message Format 2, especially considering the
|
|
encryption of the whole inner message (including To, Cc, and other fields)
|
|
when dealing with pEp users.</t>
|
|
<t>Add pEp Message Format 2.1 (additonal MIME container with preview of
|
|
all headers and some of the initial body text; special case: how to treat
|
|
HTML; e.g., show a text-only snippet?)</t>
|
|
</list></t>
|
|
|
|
</section>
|
|
|
|
|
|
</back>
|
|
|
|
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vlrlo8ECm7L8bJzY/trzd8gN/MgWoY/KaTQbgdkSovBcy0YKjCttRyYJk0Gg
|
|
FFiD5eIkdKN8Iuk9nY23nSQG9/0Ca1qFTDI5HuId3DKVbAdLgZbx7XL1NhO5
|
|
FetgLFXheOBtRrrMSJxBpzOrgFggtQD51goMBKSZqfClGS+tBCkrqFQDIvMn
|
|
rexRXK6u6RiTPYnKLvrdzk/yTQeUFI6vJYFuRVkyyHOCgEe/7Bj/HzkjFtCw
|
|
dQAA
|
|
|
|
-->
|
|
|
|
</rfc>
|
|
|