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Add ossl_rand symbols

Partial fix for #12964

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14473)
master
Shane Lontis 1 year ago
parent
commit
1335ca4b07
16 changed files with 171 additions and 176 deletions
  1. +3
    -3
      crypto/init.c
  2. +9
    -9
      crypto/rand/prov_seed.c
  3. +13
    -13
      crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
  4. +1
    -1
      crypto/rand/rand_local.h
  5. +2
    -2
      crypto/rand/rand_meth.c
  6. +27
    -27
      crypto/rand/rand_pool.c
  7. +4
    -4
      include/crypto/rand.h
  8. +19
    -19
      include/crypto/rand_pool.h
  9. +3
    -8
      providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h
  10. +3
    -3
      providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c
  11. +5
    -5
      providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_x86.c
  12. +3
    -3
      providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_tsc.c
  13. +33
    -33
      providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c
  14. +14
    -14
      providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c
  15. +11
    -11
      providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c
  16. +21
    -21
      providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c

+ 3
- 3
crypto/init.c View File

@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void)
/*
* Note that cleanup order is important:
* - rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so
* - ossl_rand_cleanup_int could call an ENGINE's RAND cleanup function so
* must be called before engine_cleanup_int()
* - ENGINEs use CRYPTO_EX_DATA and therefore, must be cleaned up
* before the ex data handlers are wiped during default ossl_lib_ctx deinit.
@ -411,8 +411,8 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanup(void)
* - ENGINEs and additional EVP algorithms might use added OIDs names so
* obj_cleanup_int() must be called last
*/
OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: rand_cleanup_int()\n");
rand_cleanup_int();
OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: ossl_rand_cleanup_int()\n");
ossl_rand_cleanup_int();
OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "OPENSSL_cleanup: conf_modules_free_int()\n");
conf_modules_free_int();


+ 9
- 9
crypto/rand/prov_seed.c View File

@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
size_t entropy_available;
RAND_POOL *pool;
pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(entropy, 1, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_entropy(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0) {
ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
}
rand_pool_free(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
size_t ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool;
pool = rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(0, 0, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
@ -60,12 +60,12 @@ size_t ossl_rand_get_nonce(ossl_unused OSSL_CORE_HANDLE *handle,
if (!ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(pool))
goto err;
if (salt != NULL && !rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0))
if (salt != NULL && !ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, salt, salt_len, 0))
goto err;
ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
ret = ossl_rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = ossl_rand_pool_detach(pool);
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}


+ 13
- 13
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c View File

@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
goto err;
# endif
if (!rand_pool_init())
if (!ossl_rand_pool_init())
goto err;
rand_inited = 1;
@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
return 0;
}
void rand_cleanup_int(void)
void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void)
{
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
meth->cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
# endif
rand_pool_cleanup();
ossl_rand_pool_cleanup();
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
if (RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep);
ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(keep);
}
/*
@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
if (!ret) {
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
RAND_POOL *pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
RAND_POOL *pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
@ -139,14 +139,14 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
goto err;
if (meth->add == NULL
|| meth->add(rand_pool_buffer(pool),
rand_pool_length(pool),
(rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
|| meth->add(ossl_rand_pool_buffer(pool),
ossl_rand_pool_length(pool),
(ossl_rand_pool_entropy(pool) / 8.0)) == 0)
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
}
return ret;
# else
@ -194,10 +194,10 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
default_RAND_meth = tmp_meth;
} else {
ENGINE_finish(e);
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
default_RAND_meth = &ossl_rand_meth;
}
# else
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
default_RAND_meth = &ossl_rand_meth;
# endif
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;


+ 1
- 1
crypto/rand/rand_local.h View File

@ -26,6 +26,6 @@
# define SECONDARY_RESEED_TIME_INTERVAL (7 * 60) /* 7 minutes */
/* The global RAND method, and the global buffer and DRBG instance. */
extern RAND_METHOD rand_meth;
extern RAND_METHOD ossl_rand_meth;
#endif

+ 2
- 2
crypto/rand/rand_meth.c View File

@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static int drbg_bytes(unsigned char *out, int count)
return EVP_RAND_generate(drbg, out, count, 0, 0, NULL, 0);
}
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
RAND_METHOD ossl_rand_meth = {
drbg_seed,
drbg_bytes,
NULL,
@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
return &rand_meth;
return &ossl_rand_meth;
#else
return NULL;
#endif


+ 27
- 27
crypto/rand/rand_pool.c View File

@ -19,8 +19,8 @@
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
*/
RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure);
@ -62,8 +62,8 @@ err:
* This function is intended to be used only for feeding random data
* provided by RAND_add() and RAND_seed() into the <master> DRBG.
*/
RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
size_t entropy)
RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
size_t entropy)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
/*
* Free |pool|, securely erasing its buffer.
*/
void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool == NULL)
return;
@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
/*
* Although it would be advisable from a cryptographical viewpoint,
* we are not allowed to clear attached buffers, since they are passed
* to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
* (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
* to ossl_rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
* (see corresponding comment in ossl_rand_pool_attach()).
*/
if (!pool->attached) {
if (pool->secure)
@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
/*
* Return the |pool|'s buffer to the caller (readonly).
*/
const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->buffer;
}
@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool)
/*
* Return the |pool|'s entropy to the caller.
*/
size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->entropy;
}
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
/*
* Return the |pool|'s buffer length to the caller.
*/
size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->len;
}
@ -140,9 +140,9 @@ size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool)
* Detach the |pool| buffer and return it to the caller.
* It's the responsibility of the caller to free the buffer
* using OPENSSL_secure_clear_free() or to re-attach it
* again to the pool using rand_pool_reattach().
* again to the pool using ossl_rand_pool_reattach().
*/
unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
unsigned char *ret = pool->buffer;
pool->buffer = NULL;
@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool)
* Re-attach the |pool| buffer. It is only allowed to pass
* the |buffer| which was previously detached from the same pool.
*/
void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
{
pool->buffer = buffer;
OPENSSL_cleanse(pool->buffer, pool->len);
@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer)
* |entropy| if the entropy count and buffer size is large enough
* 0 otherwise
*/
size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
return 0;
@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool)
* the random pool.
*/
size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
if (pool->entropy < pool->entropy_requested)
return pool->entropy_requested - pool->entropy;
@ -243,10 +243,10 @@ static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
* In case of an error, 0 is returned.
*/
size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
{
size_t bytes_needed;
size_t entropy_needed = rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
size_t entropy_needed = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(pool);
if (entropy_factor < 1) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE);
@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
/*
* Make sure the buffer is large enough for the requested amount
* of data. This guarantees that existing code patterns where
* rand_pool_add_begin, rand_pool_add_end or rand_pool_add
* ossl_rand_pool_add_begin, ossl_rand_pool_add_end or ossl_rand_pool_add
* are used to collect entropy data without any error handling
* whatsoever, continue to be valid.
* Furthermore if the allocation here fails once, make sure that
@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
}
/* Returns the remaining number of bytes available */
size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
return pool->max_len - pool->len;
}
@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool)
*
* Returns 1 if the added amount is adequate, otherwise 0
*/
int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
if (len > 0) {
/*
* This is to protect us from accidentally passing the buffer
* returned from rand_pool_add_begin.
* returned from ossl_rand_pool_add_begin.
* The check for alloc_len makes sure we do not compare the
* address of the end of the allocated memory to something
* different, since that comparison would have an
@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
* We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
* additional data.
* For entropy data, as long as the allocation request stays within
* the limits given by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow
* the limits given by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow
* below is guaranteed to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
*/
if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
@ -354,10 +354,10 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
* If |len| == 0 this is considered a no-op and a NULL pointer
* is returned without producing an error message.
*
* After updating the buffer, rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
* After updating the buffer, ossl_rand_pool_add_end() needs to be called
* to finish the update operation (see next comment).
*/
unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0)
return NULL;
@ -374,7 +374,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
/*
* As long as the allocation request stays within the limits given
* by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed
* by ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed
* to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
* We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
* additional data. Then the buffer might need to grow here,
@ -391,12 +391,12 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
* Finish to add random bytes to the random pool in-place.
*
* Finishes an in-place update of the random pool started by
* rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
* ossl_rand_pool_add_begin() (see previous comment).
* It is expected that |len| bytes of random input have been added
* to the buffer which contain at least |entropy| bits of randomness.
* It is allowed to add less bytes than originally reserved.
*/
int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);


+ 4
- 4
include/crypto/rand.h View File

@ -71,24 +71,24 @@
# define DEVRANDOM_EGD "/var/run/egd-pool", "/dev/egd-pool", "/etc/egd-pool", "/etc/entropy"
#endif
void rand_cleanup_int(void);
void ossl_rand_cleanup_int(void);
/*
* Initialise the random pool reseeding sources.
*
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
*/
int rand_pool_init(void);
int ossl_rand_pool_init(void);
/*
* Finalise the random pool reseeding sources.
*/
void rand_pool_cleanup(void);
void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void);
/*
* Control the random pool use of open file descriptors.
*/
void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep);
void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep);
/*
* Configuration


+ 19
- 19
include/crypto/rand_pool.h View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
*
* The max_len value for the buffer provided to the rand_drbg_get_entropy()
* callback is currently 2^31 bytes (2 gigabytes), if a derivation function
* is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the rand_pool_new()
* is used. Since this is much too large to be allocated, the ossl_rand_pool_new()
* function chooses more modest values as default pool length, bounded
* by RAND_POOL_MIN_LENGTH and RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH
*
@ -82,28 +82,28 @@ typedef struct rand_pool_st {
size_t entropy_requested; /* requested entropy count in bits */
} RAND_POOL;
RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
size_t entropy);
void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool);
RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len);
RAND_POOL *ossl_rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
size_t entropy);
void ossl_rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool);
const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool);
unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool);
void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer);
const unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool);
unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool);
void ossl_rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer);
size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t ossl_rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t ossl_rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool);
/* |entropy_factor| expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy */
size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor);
size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor);
size_t ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool);
int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy);
unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len);
int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy);
int ossl_rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy);
unsigned char *ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len);
int ossl_rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy);
#endif /* OSSL_PROVIDER_RAND_POOL_H */

+ 3
- 8
providers/implementations/include/prov/seeding.h View File

@ -11,13 +11,8 @@
#include "crypto/rand_pool.h"
/* Hardware-based seeding functions. */
size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool);
/* DRBG entropy callbacks. */
size_t prov_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout);
void prov_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out);
size_t ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool);
size_t ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool);
/*
* Add some platform specific additional data
@ -28,7 +23,7 @@ void prov_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out);
*
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
*/
int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
int ossl_rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool);
/*
* External seeding functions from the core dispatch table.


+ 3
- 3
providers/implementations/rands/seed_src.c View File

@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
return 0;
}
pool = rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
pool = ossl_rand_pool_new(strength, 1, outlen, outlen);
if (pool == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ static int seed_src_generate(void *vseed, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen,
entropy_available = ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
memcpy(out, rand_pool_buffer(pool), rand_pool_length(pool));
memcpy(out, ossl_rand_pool_buffer(pool), ossl_rand_pool_length(pool));
rand_pool_free(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_free(pool);
return entropy_available > 0;
}


+ 5
- 5
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_x86.c View File

@ -40,20 +40,20 @@ size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t bytes_needed;
unsigned char *buffer;
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
if (bytes_needed > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
if (get_hardware_random_value(buffer, bytes_needed) == bytes_needed) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
} else {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, 0, 0);
}
}
}
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_TANDEM) && defined(_TNS_X_TARGET)


+ 3
- 3
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_tsc.c View File

@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
* Returns the total entropy count, if it exceeds the requested
* entropy count. Otherwise, returns an entropy count of 0.
*/
size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
unsigned char c;
int i;
@ -38,10 +38,10 @@ size_t prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
if ((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1 << 4)) != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < TSC_READ_COUNT; i++) {
c = (unsigned char)(OPENSSL_rdtsc() & 0xFF);
rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, &c, 1, 4);
}
}
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
#else
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT


+ 33
- 33
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c View File

@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
# endif
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/);
for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
/*
@ -174,16 +174,16 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
/* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
}
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void)
{
}
void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
}
@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ static void close_random_device(size_t n)
rd->fd = -1;
}
int rand_pool_init(void)
int ossl_rand_pool_init(void)
{
size_t i;
@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ int rand_pool_init(void)
return 1;
}
void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void)
{
size_t i;
@ -573,26 +573,26 @@ void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
close_random_device(i);
}
void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
if (!keep)
rand_pool_cleanup();
ossl_rand_pool_cleanup();
keep_random_devices_open = keep;
}
# else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
int rand_pool_init(void)
int ossl_rand_pool_init(void)
{
return 1;
}
void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void)
{
}
void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
}
@ -618,7 +618,7 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
# else
size_t entropy_available = 0;
@ -632,12 +632,12 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
int attempts = 3;
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
}
}
}
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
unsigned char *buffer;
size_t i;
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths);
i++) {
ssize_t bytes = 0;
@ -674,11 +674,11 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
continue;
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
@ -688,22 +688,22 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
close_random_device(i);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
}
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
}
# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC)
entropy_available = prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
entropy_available = ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU)
entropy_available = prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
entropy_available = ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
@ -715,27 +715,27 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
unsigned char *buffer;
int i;
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
size_t bytes = 0;
int num;
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i],
buffer, (int)bytes_needed);
if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
bytes = bytes_needed;
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
}
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
}
# endif
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
# endif
}
# endif
@ -763,10 +763,10 @@ int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
data.time = get_time_stamp();
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
int ossl_rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
int fork_id;
@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
data.time = get_timer_bits();
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}


+ 14
- 14
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c View File

@ -362,8 +362,8 @@ size_t data_collect_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
} data;
size_t total_elems = 0;
size_t total_length = 0;
size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, ENTROPY_FACTOR);
size_t bytes_remaining = rand_pool_bytes_remaining(pool);
size_t bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, ENTROPY_FACTOR);
size_t bytes_remaining = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_remaining(pool);
/* Take all the 64-bit items first, to ensure proper alignment of data */
total_elems +=
@ -469,9 +469,9 @@ size_t data_collect_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
total_length = bytes_remaining;
/* We give the pessimistic value for the amount of entropy */
rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)data.buffer, total_length,
8 * total_length / ENTROPY_FACTOR);
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)data.buffer, total_length,
8 * total_length / ENTROPY_FACTOR);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
#endif
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
/*
@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ size_t get_entropy_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t bytes_to_get = 0;
uint32_t status;
for (bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
for (bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
bytes_needed > 0;
bytes_needed -= bytes_to_get) {
bytes_to_get =
@ -555,10 +555,10 @@ size_t get_entropy_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
return 0;
}
rand_pool_add(pool, buffer, bytes_to_get, 8 * bytes_to_get);
ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, buffer, bytes_to_get, 8 * bytes_to_get);
}
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
/*
@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
}
int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
int ossl_rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
@ -598,18 +598,18 @@ int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
#endif
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
int rand_pool_init(void)
int ossl_rand_pool_init(void)
{
return 1;
}
void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void)
{
}
void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
}

+ 11
- 11
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c View File

@ -63,20 +63,20 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
* empty implementation
* vxworks does not need to init/cleanup or keep open the random lib
*/
int rand_pool_init(void)
int ossl_rand_pool_init(void)
{
return 1;
}
void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void)
{
}
void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
}
int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
int ossl_rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
data.time = get_timer_bits();
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
data.time = get_time_stamp();
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
@ -124,14 +124,14 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
/* vxRandLib based entropy method */
size_t bytes_needed;
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
if (bytes_needed > 0)
{
int retryCount = 0;
STATUS result = ERROR;
unsigned char *buffer;
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
while ((result != OK) && (retryCount < 10)) {
RANDOM_NUM_GEN_STATUS status = randStatus();
@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
|| (status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_MAX_ENTROPY) ) {
result = randBytes(buffer, bytes_needed);
if (result == OK)
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
/*
* no else here: randStatus said ok, if randBytes failed
* it will result in another loop or no entropy
@ -156,12 +156,12 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
retryCount++;
}
}
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
#else
/*
* SEED_NONE means none, without randlib we dont have entropy and
* rely on it being added externally
*/
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
#endif /* defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB) */
}

+ 21
- 21
providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c View File

@ -53,34 +53,34 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
entropy_available = prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
entropy_available = ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
entropy_available = prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
entropy_available = ossl_prov_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
size_t bytes = 0;
if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buffer, bytes_needed,
BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
bytes = bytes_needed;
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# else
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
size_t bytes = 0;
/* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
@ -92,14 +92,14 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
}
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes_needed = ossl_rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = ossl_rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
size_t bytes = 0;
/* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
@ -111,14 +111,14 @@ size_t ossl_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
}
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
ossl_rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
return ossl_rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
}
@ -142,10 +142,10 @@ int ossl_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&data.time);
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
int ossl_rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
{
struct {
DWORD tid;
@ -162,19 +162,19 @@ int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
*/
data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
QueryPerformanceCounter(&data.time);
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
return ossl_rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
int rand_pool_init(void)
int ossl_rand_pool_init(void)
{
return 1;
}
void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
void ossl_rand_pool_cleanup(void)
{
}
void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
void ossl_rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
{
}


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