add CMP message validation and related tests; while doing so:
* add ERR_add_error_mem_bio() to crypto/err/err_prn.c
* move ossl_cmp_add_error_txt() as ERR_add_error_txt() to crypto/err/err_prn.c
* add X509_STORE_CTX_print_verify_cb() to crypto/x509/t_x509.c,
adding internally x509_print_ex_brief(), print_certs(), and print_store_certs()
* move {ossl_cmp_,}X509_STORE_get1_certs() to crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10620)
master
Dr. David von Oheimb
3 years ago
parent
235595c402
commit
31b28ad96a
@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
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LIBS=../../libcrypto
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SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= cmp_asn.c cmp_ctx.c cmp_err.c cmp_util.c \
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cmp_status.c cmp_hdr.c cmp_protect.c cmp_msg.c
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cmp_status.c cmp_hdr.c cmp_protect.c cmp_msg.c cmp_vfy.c
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@ -0,0 +1,754 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright Nokia 2007-2020
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* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2020
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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/* CMP functions for PKIMessage checking */
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#include "cmp_local.h"
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#include <openssl/cmp_util.h>
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/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
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#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
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#include <openssl/cmp.h>
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#include <openssl/crmf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include "crypto/x509.h"
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/*
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* Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
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* (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
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*
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* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
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*/
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static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, X509 *cert)
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{
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EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
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int digest_nid, pk_nid;
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const EVP_MD *digest = NULL;
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EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
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int len;
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size_t prot_part_der_len = 0;
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unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
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BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); /* may be NULL */
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int res = 0;
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if (!ossl_assert(cmp_ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && cert != NULL))
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return 0;
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/* verify that keyUsage, if present, contains digitalSignature */
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if (!cmp_ctx->ignore_keyusage
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&& (X509_get_key_usage(cert) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) == 0) {
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_USAGE_DIGITALSIGNATURE);
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goto sig_err;
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}
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pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
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if (pubkey == NULL) {
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY);
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goto sig_err;
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}
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/* create the DER representation of protected part */
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prot_part.header = msg->header;
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prot_part.body = msg->body;
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len = i2d_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
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if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL)
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goto end;
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prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
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/* verify signature of protected part */
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if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(msg->header->protectionAlg->algorithm),
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&digest_nid, &pk_nid)
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|| digest_nid == NID_undef || pk_nid == NID_undef
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|| (digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid)) == NULL) {
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ALGORITHM_NOT_SUPPORTED);
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goto sig_err;
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}
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/* check msg->header->protectionAlg is consistent with public key type */
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if (EVP_PKEY_type(pk_nid) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
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goto sig_err;
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}
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if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
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goto end;
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if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, digest, NULL, pubkey)
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&& EVP_DigestVerify(ctx, msg->protection->data,
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msg->protection->length,
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prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len) == 1) {
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res = 1;
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goto end;
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}
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sig_err:
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res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
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if (res)
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ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
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res = 0;
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end:
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EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
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BIO_free(bio);
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return res;
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}
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/* Verify a message protected with PBMAC */
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static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret)
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{
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ASN1_BIT_STRING *protection = NULL;
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int valid = 0;
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/* generate expected protection for the message */
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if ((protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, secret, NULL)) == NULL)
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return 0; /* failed to generate protection string! */
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valid = msg->protection != NULL && msg->protection->length >= 0
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&& msg->protection->type == protection->type
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&& msg->protection->length == protection->length
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&& CRYPTO_memcmp(msg->protection->data, protection->data,
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protection->length) == 0;
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ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(protection);
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if (!valid)
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_PBM_VALUE);
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return valid;
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}
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/*
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* Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
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* certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
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* and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
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*
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* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
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*/
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int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
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X509 *cert)
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{
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int valid = 0;
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X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
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int err;
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if (ctx == NULL || cert == NULL) {
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
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return 0;
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}
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if (trusted_store == NULL) {
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_TRUST_STORE);
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return 0;
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}
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if ((csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new()) == NULL
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|| !X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, trusted_store,
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cert, ctx->untrusted_certs))
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goto err;
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valid = X509_verify_cert(csc) > 0;
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/* make sure suitable error is queued even if callback did not do */
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err = ERR_peek_last_error();
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if (!valid && ERR_GET_REASON(err) != CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE)
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CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
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err:
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X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
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return valid;
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}
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/* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
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static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
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const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
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const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
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{
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char *str;
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if (expect_name == NULL)
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return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
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/* make sure that a matching name is there */
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if (actual_name == NULL) {
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ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
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return 0;
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}
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if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0)
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return 1;
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if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " does not match %s = %s", expect_desc, str);
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OPENSSL_free(str);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
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static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
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X509 *cert, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
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{
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char *actual, *expect;
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const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
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if (skid == NULL)
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return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
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/* make sure that the expected subject key identifier is there */
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if (ckid == NULL) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
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return 0;
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}
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if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0)
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return 1;
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if ((actual = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", actual);
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if ((expect = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", expect);
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OPENSSL_free(expect);
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OPENSSL_free(actual);
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return 0;
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}
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static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
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{
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int i;
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for (i = sk_X509_num(already_checked /* may be NULL */); i > 0; i--)
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if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(already_checked, i - 1), cert) == 0)
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return 1;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
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* The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
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* and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
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* Note that cert revocation etc. is checked by OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path().
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*
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* Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
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*/
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static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
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const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
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{
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X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
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char *sub, *iss;
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X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
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int time_cmp;
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ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " considering %s %s with..", desc1, desc2);
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if ((sub = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", sub);
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if ((iss = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
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ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", iss);
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OPENSSL_free(iss);
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OPENSSL_free(sub);
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if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
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|| already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
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ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert has already been checked");
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return 0;
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}
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time_cmp = X509_cmp_timeframe(vpm, X509_get0_notBefore(cert),
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X509_get0_notAfter(cert));
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if (time_cmp != 0) {
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, time_cmp > 0 ? "cert has expired"
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: "cert is not yet valid");
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return 0;
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||||
}
|
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|
||||
if (!check_name(ctx,
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"cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
|
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"sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
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return 0;
|
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|
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if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
|
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return 0;
|
||||
/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
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ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert is acceptable");
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return 1;
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}
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|
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static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
|
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X509 *scrt, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
|
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{
|
||||
if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
|
||||
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
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return 0;
|
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}
|
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if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt)) {
|
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ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert path validation failed");
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return 0;
|
||||
}
|
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return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
|
||||
* (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP and if the ctx
|
||||
* option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates from extraCerts as
|
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* trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
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* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
|
||||
*/
|
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static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
|
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const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
|
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{
|
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int valid = 0;
|
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X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
|
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|
||||
if (store != NULL /* store does not include CRLs */
|
||||
&& ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
|
||||
1 /* self-issued only */))
|
||||
valid = check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, store, scrt, msg);
|
||||
if (valid) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which is assumed to have
|
||||
* rid == 0) can also be validated with the same trusted store
|
||||
*/
|
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EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
|
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OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
|
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ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip, 0);
|
||||
X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey, crep);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
|
||||
* errors
|
||||
*/
|
||||
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
|
||||
X509_free(newcrt);
|
||||
}
|
||||
X509_STORE_free(store);
|
||||
return valid;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
|
||||
* If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
|
||||
const char *desc,
|
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const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
|
||||
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
|
||||
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int mode_3gpp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int in_extraCerts = already_checked1 == NULL;
|
||||
int n_acceptable_certs = 0;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sk_X509_num(certs) <= 0) {
|
||||
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "no %s", desc);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { /* certs may be NULL */
|
||||
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_assert(cert != NULL))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!cert_acceptable(ctx, "cert from", desc, cert,
|
||||
already_checked1, already_checked2, msg))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
n_acceptable_certs++;
|
||||
if (mode_3gpp ? check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, cert, msg)
|
||||
: check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert, msg)) {
|
||||
/* store successful sender cert for further msgs in transaction */
|
||||
if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, cert)) {
|
||||
X509_free(cert);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (in_extraCerts && n_acceptable_certs == 0)
|
||||
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "no acceptable cert in extraCerts");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
|
||||
* at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
|
||||
int mode_3gpp)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
|
||||
mode_3gpp ? "failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
|
||||
: "trying first normal mode using trust store");
|
||||
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
|
||||
NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, ctx->untrusted_certs, "untrusted certs",
|
||||
msg->extraCerts, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->trusted == NULL) {
|
||||
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, mode_3gpp ? "no self-issued extraCerts"
|
||||
: "no trusted store");
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
STACK_OF(X509) *trusted = X509_STORE_get1_all_certs(ctx->trusted);
|
||||
ret = check_msg_with_certs(ctx, trusted,
|
||||
mode_3gpp ? "self-issued extraCerts"
|
||||
: "certs in trusted store",
|
||||
msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs,
|
||||
msg, mode_3gpp);
|
||||
sk_X509_pop_free(trusted, X509_free);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
|
||||
static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
|
||||
GENERAL_NAME *sender = msg->header->sender;
|
||||
char *sname = NULL;
|
||||
char *skid_str = NULL;
|
||||
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
|
||||
OSSL_cmp_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
|
||||
int res = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
|
||||
return 0; /* other NULL cases already have been checked */
|
||||
if (sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
|
||||
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
|
||||
*/
|
||||
(void)ERR_set_mark();
|
||||
if (scrt != NULL
|
||||
&& cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
|
||||
NULL, NULL, msg)
|
||||
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
|
||||
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, scrt, msg))) {
|
||||
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
||||
|
||||
/* release any cached sender cert that proved no more successfully usable */
|
||||
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
|
||||
(void)ERR_set_mark();
|
||||
ctx->log_cb = NULL; /* temporarily disable logging diagnostic info */
|
||||
|
||||
if (check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|
||||
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */)) {
|
||||
/* discard any diagnostic info on trying to use certs */
|
||||
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; /* restore any logging */
|
||||
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
||||
res = 1;
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
|
||||
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; /* restore any logging */
|
||||
(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
|
||||
|
||||
sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
|
||||
skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
|
||||
: OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
|
||||
if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
|
||||
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "verifying msg signature with valid cert that..");
|
||||
if (sname != NULL)
|
||||
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender name = %s", sname);
|
||||
if (skid_str != NULL)
|
||||
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
|
||||
else
|
||||
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
|
||||
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
|
||||
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
|
||||
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
|
||||
if (sname != NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, "for msg sender name = ");
|
||||
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, sname);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (skid_str != NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_add_error_txt(" and ", "for msg senderKID = ");
|
||||
ERR_add_error_txt(NULL, skid_str);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
end:
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(sname);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(skid_str);
|
||||
return res;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
|
||||
* based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
|
||||
* the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
|
||||
* else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
|
||||
* (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
|
||||
* the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
|
||||
* if a self-issued certificate is found there that can be used to
|
||||
* validate the enrolled certificate returned in the IP.
|
||||
* This is according to the need given in 3GPP TS 33.310.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error or validation failed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *alg;
|
||||
int nid = NID_undef, pk_nid = NID_undef;
|
||||
const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
|
||||
X509 *scrt;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
|
||||
|| msg->header == NULL || msg->body == NULL) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((alg = msg->header->protectionAlg) == NULL /* unprotected message */
|
||||
|| msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* determine the nid for the used protection algorithm */
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, NULL, NULL, alg);
|
||||
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID);
|
||||
|
||||
switch (nid) {
|
||||
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
|
||||
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
|
||||
if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue)) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
|
||||
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
|
||||
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
|
||||
* certificate by the initiator.'
|
||||
*/
|
||||
switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
|
||||
case -1:
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
|
||||
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
|
||||
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
|
||||
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
|
||||
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* 5.1.3.2 DH Key Pairs
|
||||
* Not yet supported
|
||||
*/
|
||||
case NID_id_DHBasedMac:
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION_ALG_DHBASEDMAC);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* 5.1.3.3. Signature
|
||||
*/
|
||||
default:
|
||||
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), NULL, &pk_nid)
|
||||
|| pk_nid == NID_undef) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* validate sender name of received msg */
|
||||
if (msg->header->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
||||
break; /* FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
|
||||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
|
||||
* Expected name can be set explicitly or the subject of ctx->srvCert.
|
||||
* Mitigates risk to accept misused certificate of an unauthorized
|
||||
* entity of a trusted hierarchy.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!check_name(ctx, "sender DN field",
|
||||
msg->header->sender->d.directoryName,
|
||||
"expected sender", ctx->expected_sender))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
|
||||
|
||||
scrt = ctx->srvCert;
|
||||
if (scrt == NULL) {
|
||||
if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
} else { /* use pinned sender cert */
|
||||
/* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
|
||||
if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
/* call cert_acceptable() for adding diagnostic information */
|
||||
(void)cert_acceptable(ctx, "explicitly set", "sender cert", scrt,
|
||||
NULL, NULL, msg);
|
||||
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
|
||||
}
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/*-
|
||||
* Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
|
||||
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Ensures that:
|
||||
* it has a valid body type
|
||||
* its protection is valid or absent (allowed only if callback function is
|
||||
* present and function yields non-zero result using also supplied argument)
|
||||
* its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
|
||||
* its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If everything is fine:
|
||||
* learns the senderNonce from the received message,
|
||||
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* returns body type (which is >= 0) of the message on success, -1 on error
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
|
||||
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rcvd_type;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
|
||||
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
|
||||
"received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
|
||||
|
||||
/* validate message protection */
|
||||
if (msg->header->protectionAlg != 0) {
|
||||
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
|
||||
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
|
||||
&& (cb == NULL || !(*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg))) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
|
||||
if (cb == NULL || !(*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg)) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
|
||||
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
|
||||
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
|
||||
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
|
||||
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
|
||||
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* check CMP version number in header */
|
||||
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
|
||||
if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
|
||||
&& (msg->header->transactionID == NULL
|
||||
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
|
||||
msg->header->transactionID) != 0)) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* compare received nonce with the one we sent */
|
||||
if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
|
||||
&& (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
|
||||
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
|
||||
msg->header->recipNonce) != 0)) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* RFC 4210 section 5.1.1 states: the recipNonce is copied from
|
||||
* the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
|
||||
* --> Store for setting in next message
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, msg->header->senderNonce))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
|
||||
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
|
||||
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, msg->header->transactionID))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return rcvd_type;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
switch (msg->body->type) {
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509_REQ *req = msg->body->value.p10cr;
|
||||
|
||||
if (X509_REQ_verify(req, X509_REQ_get0_pubkey(req)) > 0)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_REQUEST_NOT_ACCEPTED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
|
||||
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
|
||||
return OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(msg->body->value.ir,
|
||||
OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID,
|
||||
accept_RAVerified);
|
||||
default:
|
||||
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||