diff --git a/android/build.gradle b/android/build.gradle index 89f16dc..802f505 100644 --- a/android/build.gradle +++ b/android/build.gradle @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ buildscript { jcenter() } dependencies { - classpath 'com.android.tools.build:gradle:4.1.2' + classpath 'com.android.tools.build:gradle:4.1.3' } } @@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ android { defaultConfig { minSdkVersion 19 targetSdkVersion 30 - versionCode 4 - versionName "2.1.8" + versionCode 6 + versionName "2.1.27" externalNativeBuild { ndkBuild { diff --git a/android/external/Makefile.conf b/android/external/Makefile.conf index 5e97085..5bb0d6c 100644 --- a/android/external/Makefile.conf +++ b/android/external/Makefile.conf @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ endif ### Sequoia deps versions OPENSSL_VERSION=1.1.1h GMP_VERSION=6.2.1 -NETTLE_VERSION=3.7 +NETTLE_VERSION=3.7.2 ### Git deps repos EXTERNAL_GIT_REPOS += libetpan|https://github.com/fdik/libetpan.git?HEAD diff --git a/android/external/arm64-v8a/Makefile b/android/external/arm64-v8a/Makefile index 31b1be6..9559ecd 100644 --- a/android/external/arm64-v8a/Makefile +++ b/android/external/arm64-v8a/Makefile @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ nettle-clean: nettle/Makefile: nettle.src.stamp -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/configure.ac ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning.patch -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/Makefile.in ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning-link.patch + -patch -N -p1 <../rsa-fixes-3.patch cd nettle && \ CC="$(CC)" LD="$(LD)" AR="$(AR)" AS="$(AS)" RANLIB=$(RANLIB) STRIP="$(STRIP)" CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS)" \ ./configure \ diff --git a/android/external/armeabi-v7a/Makefile b/android/external/armeabi-v7a/Makefile index 82de4dc..647af71 100644 --- a/android/external/armeabi-v7a/Makefile +++ b/android/external/armeabi-v7a/Makefile @@ -285,6 +285,7 @@ nettle-clean: nettle/Makefile: nettle.src.stamp -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/configure.ac ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning.patch -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/Makefile.in ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning-link.patch + -patch -N -p1 <../rsa-fixes-3.patch cd nettle && \ CC="$(CC)" LD="$(LD)" AR="$(AR)" AS="$(AS)" RANLIB=$(RANLIB) STRIP="$(STRIP)" CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS)" \ ./configure \ diff --git a/android/external/downloads/nettle-3.7.2.tar.gz.md5 b/android/external/downloads/nettle-3.7.2.tar.gz.md5 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d29e13 --- /dev/null +++ b/android/external/downloads/nettle-3.7.2.tar.gz.md5 @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +22849db27ed563ebbc829273f0c97e35 nettle-3.7.2.tar.gz diff --git a/android/external/downloads/nettle-3.7.tar.gz.md5 b/android/external/downloads/nettle-3.7.tar.gz.md5 deleted file mode 100644 index 3fe252b..0000000 --- a/android/external/downloads/nettle-3.7.tar.gz.md5 +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -568070f62fd14ca6b076ad583d84e9db nettle-3.7.tar.gz diff --git a/android/external/rsa-fixes-3.patch b/android/external/rsa-fixes-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d86ac97 --- /dev/null +++ b/android/external/rsa-fixes-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,521 @@ +diff --git a/nettle/ChangeLog b/nettle/ChangeLog +index bb169e86..4787cff6 100644 +--- a/nettle/ChangeLog ++++ b/nettle/ChangeLog +@@ -1,3 +1,39 @@ ++2021-05-22 Niels Möller ++ ++ * configure.ac: Bump package version, to 3.7.3. ++ (LIBNETTLE_MINOR): Bump minor number, to 8.4. ++ (LIBHOGWEED_MINOR): Bump minor number, to 6.4. ++ ++2021-05-17 Niels Möller ++ ++ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Check up-front that input is ++ in range. ++ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise. ++ * rsa-decrypt.c (rsa_decrypt): Likewise. ++ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Add tests with input > n. ++ ++2021-05-14 Niels Möller ++ ++ * rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument. ++ (_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require ++ that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary ++ storage, to support in-place operation, x == m. Update all ++ callers. ++ ++ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Make zero-padded copy of ++ input, for calling _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr. ++ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise. ++ ++ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Test calling all of ++ rsa_decrypt, rsa_decrypt_tr, and rsa_sec_decrypt with zero input. ++ ++2021-05-06 Niels Möller ++ ++ * pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message ++ length is valid, for given key size. ++ * testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for ++ calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length. ++ + 2021-03-21 Niels Möller + + * NEWS: NEWS entries for 3.7.2. +diff --git a/nettle/NEWS b/nettle/NEWS +index 897527c9..277ef383 100644 +--- a/nettle/NEWS ++++ b/nettle/NEWS +@@ -1,3 +1,40 @@ ++NEWS for the Nettle 3.7.3 release ++ ++ This is bugfix release, fixing bugs that could make the RSA ++ decryption functions crash on invalid inputs. ++ ++ Upgrading to the new version is strongly recommended. For ++ applications that want to support older versions of Nettle, ++ the bug can be worked around by adding a check that the RSA ++ ciphertext is in the range 0 < ciphertext < n, before ++ attempting to decrypt it. ++ ++ Thanks to Justus Winter for reporting these problems. ++ ++ The new version is intended to be fully source and binary ++ compatible with Nettle-3.6. The shared library names are ++ libnettle.so.8.4 and libhogweed.so.6.4, with sonames ++ libnettle.so.8 and libhogweed.so.6. ++ ++ Bug fixes: ++ ++ * Fix crash for zero input to rsa_sec_decrypt and ++ rsa_decrypt_tr. Potential denial of service vector. ++ ++ * Ensure that all of rsa_decrypt_tr and rsa_sec_decrypt return ++ failure for out of range inputs, instead of either crashing, ++ or silently reducing input modulo n. Potential denial of ++ service vector. ++ ++ * Ensure that all of rsa_decrypt returns failure for out of ++ range inputs, instead of silently reducing input modulo n. ++ ++ * Ensure that rsa_sec_decrypt returns failure if the message ++ size is too large for the given key. Unlike the other bugs, ++ this would typically be triggered by invalid local ++ configuration, rather than by processing untrusted remote ++ data. ++ + NEWS for the Nettle 3.7.2 release + + This is a bugfix release, fixing a bug in ECDSA signature +diff --git a/nettle/configure.ac b/nettle/configure.ac +index 9b2c153b..f4d9e905 100644 +--- a/nettle/configure.ac ++++ b/nettle/configure.ac +@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ dnl -*- mode: shell-script; sh-indentation: 2; -*- + + dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script. + +-AC_INIT([nettle], [3.7.2], [nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se]) ++AC_INIT([nettle], [3.7.3], [nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se]) + AC_PREREQ(2.61) + AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([arcfour.c]) + # Needed to stop autoconf from looking for files in parent directories. +@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([.]) + AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h]) + + LIBNETTLE_MAJOR=8 +-LIBNETTLE_MINOR=3 ++LIBNETTLE_MINOR=4 + + LIBHOGWEED_MAJOR=6 +-LIBHOGWEED_MINOR=3 ++LIBHOGWEED_MINOR=4 + + dnl Note double square brackets, for extra m4 quoting. + MAJOR_VERSION=`echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | sed 's/^\([[^.]]*\)\..*/\1/'` +diff --git a/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c +index 4f13080e..942a2bd3 100644 +--- a/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c ++++ b/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c +@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message, + volatile int ok; + size_t i, t; + +- assert (padded_message_length >= length); ++ /* Message independent branch */ ++ if (length + 11 > padded_message_length) ++ return 0; + + t = padded_message_length - length - 1; + +@@ -99,8 +101,8 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt_variable(size_t *length, uint8_t *message, + + /* length is discovered in a side-channel silent way. + * not_found goes to 0 when the terminator is found. +- * offset strts at 3 as it includes the terminator and +- * the fomat bytes already */ ++ * offset starts at 3 as it includes the terminator and ++ * the format bytes already */ + offset = 3; + for (i = 2; i < padded_message_length; i++) + { +diff --git a/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c +index 0224c0b7..4a9e9d74 100644 +--- a/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c ++++ b/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c +@@ -52,14 +52,17 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + mp_size_t key_limb_size; + int res; + +- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size); ++ /* First check that input is in range. */ ++ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0) ++ return 0; ++ ++ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n); + + TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size); + TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size); ++ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size); + +- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, +- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish), +- mpz_size(gibberish)); ++ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m); + + mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size); + +diff --git a/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c b/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c +index 7681439d..540d8baa 100644 +--- a/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c ++++ b/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c +@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key *key, + int res; + + mpz_init(m); ++ ++ /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the ++ public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */ ++ mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q); ++ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0) ++ { ++ mpz_clear (m); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish); + + res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message); +diff --git a/nettle/rsa-internal.h b/nettle/rsa-internal.h +index b828e451..f66a7df0 100644 +--- a/nettle/rsa-internal.h ++++ b/nettle/rsa-internal.h +@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key, + mp_limb_t *scratch); + + /* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the +- * result after CRT. */ ++ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */ + int + _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + const struct rsa_private_key *key, + void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, +- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn); ++ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m); + + #endif /* NETTLE_RSA_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */ +diff --git a/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c +index 6866e7c8..4c98958d 100644 +--- a/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c ++++ b/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c +@@ -55,12 +55,19 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t); + int res; + ++ /* First check that input is in range. */ ++ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0) ++ return 0; ++ + TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n)); + TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size); + +- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, +- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish), +- mpz_size(gibberish)); ++ /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size, ++ * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be ++ * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */ ++ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n)); ++ ++ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m); + + mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n)); + +diff --git a/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c b/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c +index f824c4ca..9e137c7a 100644 +--- a/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c ++++ b/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c +@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int + _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + const struct rsa_private_key *key, + void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, +- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn) ++ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m) + { ++ mp_size_t nn; + mpz_t mz; + mpz_t xz; + int res; + +- mpz_init(mz); + mpz_init(xz); + +- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn); +- mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn); ++ nn = mpz_size (pub->n); + +- res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz); ++ res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, ++ mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn)); + + if (res) +- mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n)); ++ mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn); + +- mpz_clear(mz); + mpz_clear(xz); + return res; + } + #else + /* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also +- returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */ ++ returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m, ++ no in-place operation.*/ + static void + rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, +- mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m, +- mp_size_t mn) ++ mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m) + { + const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e); + const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n); +@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + + /* c = m*(r^e) mod n */ + itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn); +- i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn); ++ i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn); + itch = MAX(itch, i2); +- i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn); ++ i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn); + itch = MAX(itch, i2); + i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn); + itch = MAX(itch, i2); + +- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch); +- scratch = tp + nn + mn; ++ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn + itch); ++ scratch = tp + 2*nn; + + /* ri = r^(-1) */ + do +@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch)); + + mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch); +- /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */ +- mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch); +- mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch); ++ mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch); ++ mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch); + mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn); + + TMP_GMP_FREE (r); +@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + TMP_GMP_FREE (tp); + } + +-/* m = c ri mod n */ ++/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */ + static void + rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c) +@@ -299,7 +297,7 @@ int + _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + const struct rsa_private_key *key, + void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random, +- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn) ++ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m) + { + TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t); + TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t); +@@ -307,7 +305,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + size_t key_limb_size; + int ret; + +- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size); ++ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n); + + /* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the + key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However, +@@ -321,19 +319,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + } + + assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size); +- assert(mn <= key_limb_size); + + TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size); + TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size); + TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key)); + +- rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn); ++ rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m); + +- _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch); ++ _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch); + +- ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x); ++ ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c); + +- rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c); ++ rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x); + + cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size); + +@@ -357,17 +354,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + mpz_t x, const mpz_t m) + { + TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t); ++ mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n); + int res; + +- mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size); +- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size); ++ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn); ++ mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn); + +- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, +- mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m)); ++ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l); + if (res) { +- mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size); +- mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size); +- mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size); ++ mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn); ++ mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn); ++ mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn); + } + + TMP_GMP_FREE (l); +diff --git a/nettle/rsa.h b/nettle/rsa.h +index 3b10155f..2dd35a2d 100644 +--- a/nettle/rsa.h ++++ b/nettle/rsa.h +@@ -428,13 +428,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + size_t length, uint8_t *message, + const mpz_t gibberish); + +-/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */ ++/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. ++ It is required that 0 <= m < n. */ + void + rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key, + mpz_t x, const mpz_t m); + + /* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after +- CRT. */ ++ CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */ + int + rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + const struct rsa_private_key *key, +diff --git a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c +index 87525f78..d1a440f6 100644 +--- a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c ++++ b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c +@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ test_main(void) + uint8_t after; + + mpz_t gibberish; ++ mpz_t bad_input; + + rsa_private_key_init(&key); + rsa_public_key_init(&pub); + mpz_init(gibberish); ++ mpz_init(bad_input); + + knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17); + +@@ -101,6 +103,42 @@ test_main(void) + ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after); + ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A'); + ++ /* Test zero input. */ ++ mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0); ++ decrypted_length = msg_length; ++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key, ++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key, ++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length); ++ ++ /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */ ++ mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n); ++ decrypted_length = msg_length; ++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key, ++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key, ++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length); ++ ++ /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */ ++ mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100); ++ mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish); ++ decrypted_length = msg_length; ++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key, ++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key, ++ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input)); ++ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length); + + /* Test invalid key. */ + mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2); +@@ -112,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void) + rsa_private_key_clear(&key); + rsa_public_key_clear(&pub); + mpz_clear(gibberish); ++ mpz_clear(bad_input); + free(decrypted); + } +- +diff --git a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c +index fb0ed3a1..3419322e 100644 +--- a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c ++++ b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c +@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_public_key *pub, + #endif + + #define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50 ++#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256 + void + test_main(void) + { +@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void) + struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx; + + uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE]; +- uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE]; ++ uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE]; + uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE]; + unsigned n_size = 1024; + mpz_t gibberish; +@@ -99,6 +100,20 @@ test_main(void) + PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1); + ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted)); + ++ ASSERT (pub.size > 10); ++ ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE); ++ ++ /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest ++ valid size is pub.size - 11. */ ++ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx, ++ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish)); ++ ++ /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */ ++ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx, ++ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random, ++ pub.size, decrypted, gibberish)); ++ + /* bad one */ + memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE); + nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx, diff --git a/android/external/x86/Makefile b/android/external/x86/Makefile index e4dcbbc..98f41dc 100644 --- a/android/external/x86/Makefile +++ b/android/external/x86/Makefile @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ nettle-clean: nettle/Makefile: nettle.src.stamp -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/configure.ac ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning.patch -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/Makefile.in ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning-link.patch + -patch -N -p1 <../rsa-fixes-3.patch cd nettle && \ CC="$(CC)" LD="$(LD)" AR="$(AR)" AS="$(AS)" RANLIB=$(RANLIB) STRIP="$(STRIP)" CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS)" \ ./configure \ diff --git a/android/external/x86_64/Makefile b/android/external/x86_64/Makefile index 887979d..e63384c 100644 --- a/android/external/x86_64/Makefile +++ b/android/external/x86_64/Makefile @@ -284,6 +284,7 @@ nettle-clean: nettle/Makefile: nettle.src.stamp -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/configure.ac ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning.patch -patch -N -p1 --reject-file=- nettle/Makefile.in ../nettle-3.4.1-remove-so-versioning-link.patch + -patch -N -p1 <../rsa-fixes-3.patch cd nettle && \ CC="$(CC)" LD="$(LD)" AR="$(AR)" AS="$(AS)" RANLIB=$(RANLIB) STRIP="$(STRIP)" CFLAGS="$(CFLAGS)" LDFLAGS="$(LDFLAGS)" \ ./configure \