Android build: Apply nettle 3.7.3 patch
#8
Merged
heck
merged 1 commits from android-nettle-update into Release_2.1 2 years ago
@ -0,0 +1 @@
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22849db27ed563ebbc829273f0c97e35 nettle-3.7.2.tar.gz
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@ -1 +0,0 @@
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568070f62fd14ca6b076ad583d84e9db nettle-3.7.tar.gz
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@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
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diff --git a/nettle/ChangeLog b/nettle/ChangeLog
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index bb169e86..4787cff6 100644
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--- a/nettle/ChangeLog
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+++ b/nettle/ChangeLog
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@@ -1,3 +1,39 @@
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+2021-05-22 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
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+
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+ * configure.ac: Bump package version, to 3.7.3.
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+ (LIBNETTLE_MINOR): Bump minor number, to 8.4.
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+ (LIBHOGWEED_MINOR): Bump minor number, to 6.4.
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+
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+2021-05-17 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
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+
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+ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Check up-front that input is
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+ in range.
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+ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
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+ * rsa-decrypt.c (rsa_decrypt): Likewise.
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+ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Add tests with input > n.
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+
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+2021-05-14 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
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+
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+ * rsa-sign-tr.c (rsa_sec_blind): Delete mn argument.
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+ (_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr): Delete mn argument, instead require
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+ that input size matches key size. Rearrange use of temporary
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+ storage, to support in-place operation, x == m. Update all
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+ callers.
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+
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+ * rsa-decrypt-tr.c (rsa_decrypt_tr): Make zero-padded copy of
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+ input, for calling _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr.
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+ * rsa-sec-decrypt.c (rsa_sec_decrypt): Likewise.
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+
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+ * testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c (test_main): Test calling all of
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+ rsa_decrypt, rsa_decrypt_tr, and rsa_sec_decrypt with zero input.
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+
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+2021-05-06 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
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+
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+ * pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c (_pkcs1_sec_decrypt): Check that message
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+ length is valid, for given key size.
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+ * testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c (test_main): Add test cases for
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+ calls to rsa_sec_decrypt specifying a too large message length.
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+
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2021-03-21 Niels Möller <nisse@lysator.liu.se>
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* NEWS: NEWS entries for 3.7.2.
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diff --git a/nettle/NEWS b/nettle/NEWS
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index 897527c9..277ef383 100644
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--- a/nettle/NEWS
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+++ b/nettle/NEWS
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@@ -1,3 +1,40 @@
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+NEWS for the Nettle 3.7.3 release
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+
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+ This is bugfix release, fixing bugs that could make the RSA
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+ decryption functions crash on invalid inputs.
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+
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+ Upgrading to the new version is strongly recommended. For
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+ applications that want to support older versions of Nettle,
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+ the bug can be worked around by adding a check that the RSA
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+ ciphertext is in the range 0 < ciphertext < n, before
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+ attempting to decrypt it.
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+
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+ Thanks to Justus Winter for reporting these problems.
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+
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+ The new version is intended to be fully source and binary
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+ compatible with Nettle-3.6. The shared library names are
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+ libnettle.so.8.4 and libhogweed.so.6.4, with sonames
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+ libnettle.so.8 and libhogweed.so.6.
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+
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+ Bug fixes:
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+
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+ * Fix crash for zero input to rsa_sec_decrypt and
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+ rsa_decrypt_tr. Potential denial of service vector.
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+
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+ * Ensure that all of rsa_decrypt_tr and rsa_sec_decrypt return
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+ failure for out of range inputs, instead of either crashing,
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+ or silently reducing input modulo n. Potential denial of
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+ service vector.
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+
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+ * Ensure that all of rsa_decrypt returns failure for out of
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+ range inputs, instead of silently reducing input modulo n.
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+
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+ * Ensure that rsa_sec_decrypt returns failure if the message
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+ size is too large for the given key. Unlike the other bugs,
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+ this would typically be triggered by invalid local
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+ configuration, rather than by processing untrusted remote
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+ data.
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+
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NEWS for the Nettle 3.7.2 release
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This is a bugfix release, fixing a bug in ECDSA signature
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diff --git a/nettle/configure.ac b/nettle/configure.ac
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index 9b2c153b..f4d9e905 100644
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--- a/nettle/configure.ac
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+++ b/nettle/configure.ac
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ dnl -*- mode: shell-script; sh-indentation: 2; -*-
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dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
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-AC_INIT([nettle], [3.7.2], [nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se])
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+AC_INIT([nettle], [3.7.3], [nettle-bugs@lists.lysator.liu.se])
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AC_PREREQ(2.61)
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AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([arcfour.c])
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# Needed to stop autoconf from looking for files in parent directories.
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@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ AC_CONFIG_AUX_DIR([.])
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AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
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LIBNETTLE_MAJOR=8
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-LIBNETTLE_MINOR=3
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+LIBNETTLE_MINOR=4
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LIBHOGWEED_MAJOR=6
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-LIBHOGWEED_MINOR=3
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+LIBHOGWEED_MINOR=4
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dnl Note double square brackets, for extra m4 quoting.
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MAJOR_VERSION=`echo $PACKAGE_VERSION | sed 's/^\([[^.]]*\)\..*/\1/'`
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diff --git a/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c b/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
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index 4f13080e..942a2bd3 100644
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--- a/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
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+++ b/nettle/pkcs1-sec-decrypt.c
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@@ -63,7 +63,9 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt (size_t length, uint8_t *message,
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volatile int ok;
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size_t i, t;
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- assert (padded_message_length >= length);
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+ /* Message independent branch */
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+ if (length + 11 > padded_message_length)
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+ return 0;
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t = padded_message_length - length - 1;
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@@ -99,8 +101,8 @@ _pkcs1_sec_decrypt_variable(size_t *length, uint8_t *message,
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/* length is discovered in a side-channel silent way.
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* not_found goes to 0 when the terminator is found.
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- * offset strts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
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- * the fomat bytes already */
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+ * offset starts at 3 as it includes the terminator and
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+ * the format bytes already */
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offset = 3;
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for (i = 2; i < padded_message_length; i++)
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{
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diff --git a/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c b/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
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index 0224c0b7..4a9e9d74 100644
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--- a/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
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+++ b/nettle/rsa-decrypt-tr.c
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@@ -52,14 +52,17 @@ rsa_decrypt_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
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mp_size_t key_limb_size;
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int res;
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- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
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+ /* First check that input is in range. */
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+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
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+ return 0;
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+
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+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
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TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, key_limb_size);
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TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
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+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, key_limb_size);
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- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
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- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
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- mpz_size(gibberish));
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+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
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mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, key_limb_size);
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diff --git a/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c b/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c
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index 7681439d..540d8baa 100644
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--- a/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c
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+++ b/nettle/rsa-decrypt.c
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@@ -48,6 +48,16 @@ rsa_decrypt(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
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int res;
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mpz_init(m);
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+
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+ /* First check that input is in range. Since we don't have the
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+ public key available here, we need to reconstruct n. */
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+ mpz_mul (m, key->p, key->q);
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+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, m) >= 0)
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+ {
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+ mpz_clear (m);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+
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rsa_compute_root(key, m, gibberish);
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res = pkcs1_decrypt (key->size, m, length, message);
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diff --git a/nettle/rsa-internal.h b/nettle/rsa-internal.h
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index b828e451..f66a7df0 100644
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--- a/nettle/rsa-internal.h
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+++ b/nettle/rsa-internal.h
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@@ -78,11 +78,11 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
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mp_limb_t *scratch);
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/* Safe side-channel silent variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the
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- * result after CRT. */
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+ * result after CRT. In-place calls, with x == m, is allowed. */
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int
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_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
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const struct rsa_private_key *key,
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void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
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- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn);
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+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m);
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#endif /* NETTLE_RSA_INTERNAL_H_INCLUDED */
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diff --git a/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c b/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
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index 6866e7c8..4c98958d 100644
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--- a/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
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+++ b/nettle/rsa-sec-decrypt.c
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@@ -55,12 +55,19 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
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TMP_GMP_DECL (em, uint8_t);
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int res;
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+ /* First check that input is in range. */
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+ if (mpz_sgn (gibberish) < 0 || mpz_cmp (gibberish, pub->n) >= 0)
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+ return 0;
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+
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TMP_GMP_ALLOC (m, mpz_size(pub->n));
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TMP_GMP_ALLOC (em, key->size);
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- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m,
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- mpz_limbs_read(gibberish),
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- mpz_size(gibberish));
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+ /* We need a copy because m can be shorter than key_size,
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+ * but _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr expect all inputs to be
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+ * normalized to a key_size long buffer length */
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+ mpz_limbs_copy(m, gibberish, mpz_size(pub->n));
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+
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+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, m, m);
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mpn_get_base256 (em, key->size, m, mpz_size(pub->n));
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diff --git a/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c b/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c
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index f824c4ca..9e137c7a 100644
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--- a/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c
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+++ b/nettle/rsa-sign-tr.c
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@@ -131,35 +131,34 @@ int
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_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
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const struct rsa_private_key *key,
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void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
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- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
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+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
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{
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+ mp_size_t nn;
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mpz_t mz;
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mpz_t xz;
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int res;
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- mpz_init(mz);
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mpz_init(xz);
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- mpn_copyi(mpz_limbs_write(mz, mn), m, mn);
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- mpz_limbs_finish(mz, mn);
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+ nn = mpz_size (pub->n);
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- res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz, mz);
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+ res = rsa_compute_root_tr(pub, key, random_ctx, random, xz,
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+ mpz_roinit_n(mz, m, nn));
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if (res)
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- mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, mpz_size(pub->n));
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+ mpz_limbs_copy(x, xz, nn);
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- mpz_clear(mz);
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mpz_clear(xz);
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return res;
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}
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#else
|
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/* Blinds m, by computing c = m r^e (mod n), for a random r. Also
|
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- returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. */
|
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+ returns the inverse (ri), for use by rsa_unblind. Must have c != m,
|
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+ no in-place operation.*/
|
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static void
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rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
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void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
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- mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m,
|
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- mp_size_t mn)
|
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+ mp_limb_t *c, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *m)
|
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{
|
||||
const mp_limb_t *ep = mpz_limbs_read (pub->e);
|
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const mp_limb_t *np = mpz_limbs_read (pub->n);
|
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@@ -177,15 +176,15 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
|
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/* c = m*(r^e) mod n */
|
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itch = mpn_sec_powm_itch(nn, ebn, nn);
|
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- i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, mn);
|
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+ i2 = mpn_sec_mul_itch(nn, nn);
|
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itch = MAX(itch, i2);
|
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- i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(nn + mn, nn);
|
||||
+ i2 = mpn_sec_div_r_itch(2*nn, nn);
|
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itch = MAX(itch, i2);
|
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i2 = mpn_sec_invert_itch(nn);
|
||||
itch = MAX(itch, i2);
|
||||
|
||||
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, nn + mn + itch);
|
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- scratch = tp + nn + mn;
|
||||
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (tp, 2*nn + itch);
|
||||
+ scratch = tp + 2*nn;
|
||||
|
||||
/* ri = r^(-1) */
|
||||
do
|
||||
@@ -198,9 +197,8 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
while (!mpn_sec_invert (ri, tp, np, nn, 2 * nn * GMP_NUMB_BITS, scratch));
|
||||
|
||||
mpn_sec_powm (c, rp, nn, ep, ebn, np, nn, scratch);
|
||||
- /* normally mn == nn, but m can be smaller in some cases */
|
||||
- mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, mn, scratch);
|
||||
- mpn_sec_div_r (tp, nn + mn, np, nn, scratch);
|
||||
+ mpn_sec_mul (tp, c, nn, m, nn, scratch);
|
||||
+ mpn_sec_div_r (tp, 2*nn, np, nn, scratch);
|
||||
mpn_copyi(c, tp, nn);
|
||||
|
||||
TMP_GMP_FREE (r);
|
||||
@@ -208,7 +206,7 @@ rsa_sec_blind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
TMP_GMP_FREE (tp);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
-/* m = c ri mod n */
|
||||
+/* m = c ri mod n. Allows x == c. */
|
||||
static void
|
||||
rsa_sec_unblind (const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
mp_limb_t *x, mp_limb_t *ri, const mp_limb_t *c)
|
||||
@@ -299,7 +297,7 @@ int
|
||||
_rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
|
||||
void *random_ctx, nettle_random_func *random,
|
||||
- mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m, size_t mn)
|
||||
+ mp_limb_t *x, const mp_limb_t *m)
|
||||
{
|
||||
TMP_GMP_DECL (c, mp_limb_t);
|
||||
TMP_GMP_DECL (ri, mp_limb_t);
|
||||
@@ -307,7 +305,7 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
size_t key_limb_size;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
- key_limb_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
|
||||
+ key_limb_size = mpz_size(pub->n);
|
||||
|
||||
/* mpz_powm_sec handles only odd moduli. If p, q or n is even, the
|
||||
key is invalid and rejected by rsa_private_key_prepare. However,
|
||||
@@ -321,19 +319,18 @@ _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assert(mpz_size(pub->n) == key_limb_size);
|
||||
- assert(mn <= key_limb_size);
|
||||
|
||||
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (c, key_limb_size);
|
||||
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (ri, key_limb_size);
|
||||
TMP_GMP_ALLOC (scratch, _rsa_sec_compute_root_itch(key));
|
||||
|
||||
- rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, x, ri, m, mn);
|
||||
+ rsa_sec_blind (pub, random_ctx, random, c, ri, m);
|
||||
|
||||
- _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, c, x, scratch);
|
||||
+ _rsa_sec_compute_root(key, x, c, scratch);
|
||||
|
||||
- ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, c, x);
|
||||
+ ret = rsa_sec_check_root(pub, x, c);
|
||||
|
||||
- rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, c);
|
||||
+ rsa_sec_unblind(pub, x, ri, x);
|
||||
|
||||
cnd_mpn_zero(1 - ret, x, key_limb_size);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -357,17 +354,17 @@ rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m)
|
||||
{
|
||||
TMP_GMP_DECL (l, mp_limb_t);
|
||||
+ mp_size_t nn = mpz_size(pub->n);
|
||||
int res;
|
||||
|
||||
- mp_size_t l_size = NETTLE_OCTET_SIZE_TO_LIMB_SIZE(key->size);
|
||||
- TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, l_size);
|
||||
+ TMP_GMP_ALLOC (l, nn);
|
||||
+ mpz_limbs_copy(l, m, nn);
|
||||
|
||||
- res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l,
|
||||
- mpz_limbs_read(m), mpz_size(m));
|
||||
+ res = _rsa_sec_compute_root_tr (pub, key, random_ctx, random, l, l);
|
||||
if (res) {
|
||||
- mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, l_size);
|
||||
- mpn_copyi (xp, l, l_size);
|
||||
- mpz_limbs_finish (x, l_size);
|
||||
+ mp_limb_t *xp = mpz_limbs_write (x, nn);
|
||||
+ mpn_copyi (xp, l, nn);
|
||||
+ mpz_limbs_finish (x, nn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
TMP_GMP_FREE (l);
|
||||
diff --git a/nettle/rsa.h b/nettle/rsa.h
|
||||
index 3b10155f..2dd35a2d 100644
|
||||
--- a/nettle/rsa.h
|
||||
+++ b/nettle/rsa.h
|
||||
@@ -428,13 +428,14 @@ rsa_sec_decrypt(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
size_t length, uint8_t *message,
|
||||
const mpz_t gibberish);
|
||||
|
||||
-/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed. */
|
||||
+/* Compute x, the e:th root of m. Calling it with x == m is allowed.
|
||||
+ It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
|
||||
void
|
||||
rsa_compute_root(const struct rsa_private_key *key,
|
||||
mpz_t x, const mpz_t m);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Safer variant, using RSA blinding, and checking the result after
|
||||
- CRT. */
|
||||
+ CRT. It is required that 0 <= m < n. */
|
||||
int
|
||||
rsa_compute_root_tr(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
const struct rsa_private_key *key,
|
||||
diff --git a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
|
||||
index 87525f78..d1a440f6 100644
|
||||
--- a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
|
||||
+++ b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-encrypt-test.c
|
||||
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ test_main(void)
|
||||
uint8_t after;
|
||||
|
||||
mpz_t gibberish;
|
||||
+ mpz_t bad_input;
|
||||
|
||||
rsa_private_key_init(&key);
|
||||
rsa_public_key_init(&pub);
|
||||
mpz_init(gibberish);
|
||||
+ mpz_init(bad_input);
|
||||
|
||||
knuth_lfib_init(&lfib, 17);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -101,6 +103,42 @@ test_main(void)
|
||||
ASSERT(decrypted[decrypted_length] == after);
|
||||
ASSERT(decrypted[0] == 'A');
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* Test zero input. */
|
||||
+ mpz_set_ui (bad_input, 0);
|
||||
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
|
||||
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
|
||||
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Test input that is slightly larger than n */
|
||||
+ mpz_add(bad_input, gibberish, pub.n);
|
||||
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
|
||||
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
|
||||
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Test input that is considerably larger than n */
|
||||
+ mpz_mul_2exp (bad_input, pub.n, 100);
|
||||
+ mpz_add (bad_input, bad_input, gibberish);
|
||||
+ decrypted_length = msg_length;
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt(&key, &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_decrypt_tr(&pub, &key,
|
||||
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ &decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(!rsa_sec_decrypt(&pub, &key,
|
||||
+ &lfib, (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ decrypted_length, decrypted, bad_input));
|
||||
+ ASSERT(decrypted_length == msg_length);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Test invalid key. */
|
||||
mpz_add_ui (key.q, key.q, 2);
|
||||
@@ -112,6 +150,6 @@ test_main(void)
|
||||
rsa_private_key_clear(&key);
|
||||
rsa_public_key_clear(&pub);
|
||||
mpz_clear(gibberish);
|
||||
+ mpz_clear(bad_input);
|
||||
free(decrypted);
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
diff --git a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
|
||||
index fb0ed3a1..3419322e 100644
|
||||
--- a/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
|
||||
+++ b/nettle/testsuite/rsa-sec-decrypt-test.c
|
||||
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ rsa_decrypt_for_test(const struct rsa_public_key *pub,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#define PAYLOAD_SIZE 50
|
||||
+#define DECRYPTED_SIZE 256
|
||||
void
|
||||
test_main(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ test_main(void)
|
||||
struct knuth_lfib_ctx random_ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
uint8_t plaintext[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
||||
- uint8_t decrypted[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
||||
+ uint8_t decrypted[DECRYPTED_SIZE];
|
||||
uint8_t verifybad[PAYLOAD_SIZE];
|
||||
unsigned n_size = 1024;
|
||||
mpz_t gibberish;
|
||||
@@ -99,6 +100,20 @@ test_main(void)
|
||||
PAYLOAD_SIZE, decrypted, gibberish) == 1);
|
||||
ASSERT (MEMEQ (PAYLOAD_SIZE, plaintext, decrypted));
|
||||
|
||||
+ ASSERT (pub.size > 10);
|
||||
+ ASSERT (pub.size <= DECRYPTED_SIZE);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Check that too large message length is rejected, largest
|
||||
+ valid size is pub.size - 11. */
|
||||
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
|
||||
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ pub.size - 10, decrypted, gibberish));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* This case used to result in arithmetic underflow and a crash. */
|
||||
+ ASSERT (!rsa_decrypt_for_test (&pub, &key, &random_ctx,
|
||||
+ (nettle_random_func *) knuth_lfib_random,
|
||||
+ pub.size, decrypted, gibberish));
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* bad one */
|
||||
memcpy(decrypted, verifybad, PAYLOAD_SIZE);
|
||||
nettle_mpz_random_size(garbage, &random_ctx,
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue