p≡p JSON adapter
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p≡p JSON Server Adapter


The p≡p JSON Server Adapter provides a REST-like jQuery-compatible API to connect with the p≡p engine. It is language-independent and can be used by any client.


In order to use the p≡p JSON Server Adapter, you need to build and run it. Currently, Linux (Debian 9, Ubuntu 16.04) and MacOS (10.11, 10.12) are supported, Windows is about to follow. Newer versions should also work (file a bug report if not) but are not in our main focus, yet.


  • C++ compiler: tested with g++ 4.8 and 4.9, and clang++ 2.8. Newer versions should work, too.
  • GNU make
  • libboost-thread-dev (tested with 1.58)
  • libboost-program-options-dev (tested with 1.58)
  • libboost-filesystem-dev (tested with 1.58)
  • libevent-dev 2.0.21 or 2.0.22 (or build from source, see below)
  • p≡p Engine (which needs gpgme-thread, a patched libetpan, libboost-system-dev)
  • OSSP libuuid


Install the dependencies

Debian 9:

apt install -y build-essential libboost1.62-dev libboost-system1.62-dev \
    libboost-filesystem1.62-dev libboost-program-options1.62-dev \
    libboost-thread1.62-dev libgpgme-dev uuid-dev

macOS 10.12:

Use homebrew or macports to install the required libraries.

For more explicit instructions on how to do this with macports, see the section below.

Build and install the pEp Engine. Instructions can be found here: https://cacert.pep.foundation/dev/repos/pEpEngine/file/ef23982e4744/README.md.

Build and install libevent

mkdir ~/code/json-ad
hg clone https://cacert.pep.foundation/dev/repos/pEpJSONServerAdapter/ ~/code/json-ad
cd ~/code/json-ad
./configure --prefix="$HOME/code/json-ad/libevent-2.0.22-stable/build/" --disable-openssl
make install

Build and install the JSON server

cd cd ~/code/json-ad/server

Edit the build configuration to your needs in ./Makefile.conf, or create a ./local.conf that sets any of the make variables documented in ./Makefile.conf.

If a dependency is not found in your system's default include or library paths, you will have to specify the according paths in a make variable. Typically, this has to be done at least for the pEp Engine, libetpan and libevent.

Below are two sample ./local.conf files, for orientation.

macOS 10.12:








Debian 9:





Now, build and install the server:

make all
make install

With make test you can execute the server's tests.


Install MacPorts for your version of macOS.

If MacPorts is already installed on your machine, but was installed by a different user, make sure your PATH variable is set as follows in ~/.profile:

export PATH="/opt/local/bin:/opt/local/sbin:$PATH"

Install dependencies packaged with MacPorts as follows.

sudo port install gpgme boost ossp-uuid

Running the pEp JSON Adapter

You can use make run to start the server.

  1. Run ./pep-json-server. This creates a file that is readable only by the current user (/tmp/pEp-json-token-${USER}) and contains the address and port the JSON adapter is listening on, normally and a "security-token" that must be given in each function call to authenticate you as the valid user.

  2. Visit that address (normally in your JavaScript-enabled web browser to see the "JavaScript test client".

  3. Call any function ("version()" or "get_gpg_path()" should work just fine) with the correct security token.

Using the p≡p JSON Adapter

In the following section, you'll find background information on how to use the adapter and its functions.

### Server startup and shutdown

The JSON Server Adapter can be started on demand. It checks automatically whether an instance for the same user on the machine is already running and if yes it ends itself gracefully.

If there is no running server found the newly started server creates the server token file and forks itself into background (if not prevented via "-d" commandline switch).

Session handling

When using the p≡p engine, a session is needed to which any adapter can connect. The p≡p JSON Server Adapter automatically creates one session per HTTP client connection (and also closes that session automatically when the client connections is closed). Therefore, the client does not need to take care of the session management. However, the client has to set up a HTTP persistent connection.

API Principles

All C data types are mapped the same way, so some day the JSON wrapper can be generated from the p≡p Engine header files (or the JSON wrapper and the p≡p engine header are both generated from a common interface description file).

C type JSON mapping
bool JSON boolean
int JSON decimal number
size_t JSON decimal number
char* (representing a UTF-8-encoded NULL-terminated string JSON string
char* (representing a binary string base64-encoded JSON string
enum either JSON decimal number or JSON object containing one decimal number as member
struct JSON object
linked lists (e.g. bloblist_t, stringlist_t, identity_list etc.) JSON array of their member data type (without the next pointer)

The parameter type PEP_SESSION is handled automatically by the JSON Server Adapter and the PEP_SESSION parameter is omitted from the JSON API.

enum types

Enum types are represented as JSON objects with one member, whose name is derived from the enum type name, holding the numeric value of the enum.

Some enum types are still represented directly as JSON decimal number. It shall be changed in a future version of the JSON Adapter.

String types

The JSON Server Adapter does automatic memory management for string parameters. The current p≡p Engine's API distinguish between const char* parameters and char* parameters. const char* normally means: the "ownership" of the string remains at the caller, so the JSON Adapter frees the string automatically after the call. char* normally means: the "ownership" of the string goes to the Engine, so the JSON Adapter does not free string.

If there are functions that have a different semantics the behavior of the JSON wrapper has to be changed.

Parameter (value) restrictions

Some API functions have restrictions on their parameter values. The JSON Adapter does not know these restrictions (because it does not know the semantics of the wrapped functions at all). So it is the client's responsibility to fulfill these parameter restrictions! Especially when there are restrictions that are checked with assert() within the p≡p Engine, it is impossible for the JSON Adapter to catch failed assertions - the Engine and the Adapter process will be terminated immediatetely when the Engine is compiled in debug mode (= with enabled assert() checking).

Currently there are no range checks for numerical parameter types (e.g. a JSON decimal number can hold a bigger value than the int parameter type of a certain C function).

API Reference

An complete overview with all functions that are callable from the client can be found in the [API Reference](pEp JSON Server Adapter/API Reference).

That API reference is a generated file that shows the current API briefly. There is also a (currently manually written) file that holts a copy of the documentation from the Engine's header files: [API reference detail.md]

Most of the callable functions are functions from the C API of the p≡p Engine. They are described in detail, incl. pre- and post-conditions in the appropriate C header files of the Engine.


The JSON Server Adapter and the client have to authenticate to each other. "Authentication" in this case means "run with the same user rights". This is done by proving that each communication partner is able to read a certain file that has user-only read permissions.

  1. There is a common (between client & server) algorithm to create the path and filename of the "server token file", for a given user name. The token file and its directory MUST be owned by the user and MUST be readable and writable only by the user, nobody else. Client and server check for the right ownership and access rights of the token file and its directory. (TODO: What shall be done if that check fails?)

  2. The server creates a "server token file" containing a "server token" and the IP address and port where the server listens on. This file can only be read by client programs that run with the same user rights.

  3. The client checks the path, reads the "server token" from the file and authenticates itself to the server in each JSON RPC call with that "server token".

Extending / customizing

If you want to extend or customize the p≡p JSON Adapter, there are several rules and definitions to take into account.


  • The FunctionMap function in ev_server.cc defines which functions are callable via the JSON-RPC interface. The existing entries show the syntax of that map. Non-static member functions can be called, too. Thanks to std::function<> a member function Foo::func(Params...) is handled like a free-standing function func(Foo* f, Params...).

  • For each type there must exist specializations of the template classes "In" (for input parameters) and "Out" (for output parameters). The linker will tell you, which specializations are needed.

  • The specializations for "generic types" are in function_map.cc.

  • The specializations for "p≡p-specific types" are in pep-types.cc.


The following issues are planned but not yet implemented.

  • Windows build:

    • implement get_token_filename() for MS Windows (security-token.cc line 43)
    • do the Windows-specific stuff to build the software on Windows
  • Add unit tests

  • Fix the bugs that are found by the Unit tests, if any.

  • Generate all the tedious boiler plate code

    • the content of pep-types.cc
    • perhaps the FunctionMap 'function' in mt-server.cc
    • perhaps the JavaScript side of the HTML test page to ensure to be consistent with the server side in pep-types.cc
  • Adapt the "p≡p Transport API", when it is final. (either manually or by code generator, if ready)

Appendix A: Attack scenarios on the authentication

Let's discuss different attack / threat scenarios. I don't know which are realistic or possible, yet.

### General ideas / improvements

Currently the JSON Server Adapter writes its server token file in a directory that is only readable & writable by the user itself.

The server token file is written in $HOME/.pEp/json-token on UNIX/Linux/MacOS and %LOCALAPPDATA%/pEp/json-token on MS Windows.

The JSON Server Adapter also checks whether .pEp has 0700 access rights on unixoid systems.

### Attacker with the same user rights

If the attacker is able to run his malicious code with the same user rights as the JSON Server Adapter and his legitimate client, it is (and always will be) impossible to prevent this attack. Such an attacker also can just start a legitimate client that is under his control.

The same applies to an attacker who gains root / admin access rights.

Fake Server with different user rights

 ,----------.      ,--------.
 | Attacker | <==> | Client |
 `----------'      `--------'

If no real JSON Adapter runs an attacker can create a fake server that pretends to be a legitimate JSON Adapter. It creates its own server token file, with different and conspicuous access rights, but a limited JavaScript client might be unable to detect the file permissions.

This fake server cannot access the private key of the user but it might get sensitive plaintext data the client wants to encrypt. The fake server cannot sign the encrypted data so the fake would be conspicuous, too. But that would be too late, because the sensitive plaintext data could already be leaked by the fake server.

This attack needs a user's home directory that is writable by someone else (to create a ~/.pEp/ directory) or a foreign-writable ~/.pEp/ directory.

The pEpEngine creates a ~/.pEp/ directory (if not yet exists) and sets the permissions to 0700 explicitly.

Man-in-the-middle with different user rights

 ,---------------------.      ,----------.      ,--------.
 | JSON Server Adapter | <==> | Attacker | <==> | Client |
 `---------------------'      `----------'      `--------'
  • The attacker cannot read "client token file" nor "server token file".

  • The server cannot check "who" connects to it, until the client authenticates itself, which might be relayed by the attacker from the original client.

  • The attacker has to convince the client that it is a legitimate server. It has to create a fake "server token file" to divert the client to the attacker's port. But that fake file cannot contain the right server token because the attacker does not know it.

    • if the server started before the attacker the "server token file"'s access rights should prevent this (no write access for the attacker, no "delete" right in common TEMP dir (sticky bit on the directory)
    • if the attacker starts before the server it can write a fake toke file. The server could detect it but is unable to notice the legitimate client. The client could detect it when it can check the file access rights. There might be race conditons...
  • Is it possible for the attacker to let the client send the right server token to him, at least temporarily (e.g. within a race condition)?

    • As long as the server runs, the attacker cannot bind to the same address & port. Finding and binding of the port is done by the server before the server token file is created and filled.
    • When the server that created the "server token file" dies, its port becomes available for the attacker, but the server token is no longer valid and no longer useful for the attacker.
  • there might be a very small chance for a race condition:

    1. The attacker opens a connection to the running server but does not use it. To find the server it cannot read the server configuration file, but it can ask the OS for ports that are open in "listen" mode. Normally the JSON Adapter listens on 4223 or some port numbers above that. That means: guessing the server's address is quite easy.
    2. when the server shuts down, the attacker immediately binds itself to that port. If a client connects just in this moment it sends the server token to the attacker, not to the server. But the attacker can use that token now to the server via the already opened TCP connection.
    3. To prevent this the server should call shutdown(2) on its listening socket to block any new client connection, but still block the port. (is that the case on all platforms?) Than close(2) all TCP connections to the clients (if any) and than also delete the server token file. Finally call close(2) on the listening socket.